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Abstract
Many classical social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only
when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are considered. Thus, they generally
admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule.
In this paper we find out conditions which make a social preference (multiwinner social choice)
correspondence admit a resolute refinement fulfilling suitable weak versions of the anonymity
and neutrality principles, as well as reversal symmetry (immunity to the reversal bias).
Keywords: social preference correspondence; multiwinner social choice correspondence; resolute-
ness; anonymity; neutrality; tie-breaking rule.
JEL classification: D71.
1 Introduction
Consider a committee having h ě 2 members whose purpose is to determine a ranking of n ě 2
alternatives and assume that committee members are supposed to express their preferences via a
ranking of the alternatives. A preference profile is a list of individual preferences, one for each
committee member, and a social preference correspondence (spc) is a correspondence from the set
of preference profiles to the set of alternatives rankings. Each spc represents then a particular
decision process which determines a set of social preferences, whatever individual preferences the
committee members express.
In the literature many spcs have been proposed and studied. Most of them satisfy two require-
ments which are considered strongly desirable by social choice theorists, namely anonymity and
∗Daniela Bubboloni was supported by GNSAGA of INdAM.
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neutrality. A spc is said anonymous if the identities of individuals are irrelevant to determine the
social outcome, that is, it selects the same social outcome for any pair of preference profiles such
that we get one from the other by permuting individual names; neutral if alternatives are equally
treated, that is, for every pair of preference profiles such that we get one from the other by per-
muting alternative names, the social outcomes associated with them coincide up to the considered
permutation.
Since in many cases collective decision processes are required to select a unique outcome, an
important role in social choice theory is played by resolute spcs, namely those spcs associating
a singleton with any preference profile. Unfortunately, classical spcs are not resolute in general.
As a consequence, if the members of a committee agree to use a classical spc to aggregate their
preferences and a unique outcome is needed, then they also need to find an agreement on which
tie-breaking rule to use when two or more rankings are selected by the chosen spc.
The concept of tie-breaking rule can be naturally formalized in terms of refinement of a spc.
Let C and C 1 be two spcs. We say that C 1 is a refinement of C if, for every preference profile, the
set of social preferences selected by C 1 is a subset of the set of social preferences selected by C.
Thus, refinements of C can be thought as methods to reduce the ambiguity in the choice made by
C. In particular, resolute refinements of C completely eliminate the ambiguity leading to a unique
social outcome, so that they can be identified with the possible tie-breaking rules for C. In general,
if C is not resolute, it admits many resolute refinements. Thus, an interesting issue to address is to
understand whether it is possible to find resolute refinements of C which satisfy suitable properties.
In particular, since it is immediate to understand that resolute refinements of even anonymous and
neutral spcs are not generally anonymous and neutral, one may wonder whether anonymous and
neutral resolute refinements of a given spc do exist. Unfortunately, as proved by Bubboloni and
Gori (2014, Theorem 5), the existence of an anonymous, neutral and resolute spc is equivalent to
the strong arithmetical condition gcdph, n!q “ 1 which is rarely satisfied in practical situations1. As
a consequence, given a spc, we cannot in general get any anonymous and neutral resolute refinement
of it.
In many concrete cases, however, anonymity and neutrality are too strong requirements. That
happens, for instance, for those committees having a president who is more influential than the other
committee members or when a committee evaluates job candidates giving the female candidates an
advantage over the male ones. Indeed, in such situations, individual and alternative names are not
immaterial. For such a reason, we propose generalized versions of anonymity and neutrality which
can take into account possible distinctions among individuals and among alternatives. Consider Sh,
the group of permutations of the set H “ t1, . . . , hu of committee member names and Sn, the group
of permutations of the set N “ t1, . . . , nu of alternative names. Given a subgroup V of Sh we say
that a spc is V -anonymous if it selects the same social outcome for any pair of preference profiles
such that we get one from the other by permuting individual names according to a permutation in
V ; given a subgroup W of Sn we say that a spc is W -neutral if, for every pair of preference profiles
such that we get one from the other by permuting alternative names according to a permutation in
W , it associates with them social outcomes which coincide up to the considered permutation. The
special groups of permutations V and W need to be determined on the basis of the specific features
of the situation at hand. Of course, Sh-anonymity corresponds to anonymity and Sn-neutrality
corresponds neutrality. As a consequence, each anonymous (neutral) spc is V -anonymous (W -
neutral) for every V (W ). It is also worth noting that, depending on the particular structure of V
1The condition gcdph, n!q “ 1 was first introduced by Moulin (1983, Theorem 1, p.25) as a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of anonymous, neutral and efficient social choice functions; Bubboloni and Gori (2014,
Theorem 15) generalize Moulin’s result considering in addition the qualified majority principle; Campbell and Kelly
(2015) show that if n ą h (so that gcdph, n!q ‰ 1) and anonymous, neutral and resolute social choice functions
exist, then those functions exhibit even more undesirable behaviours than inefficiency. The existence of anonymous,
neutral and resolute spcs satisfying further properties is also studied by Bubboloni and Gori (2015), who focus on
the majority principle, and Dog˘an and Giritligil (2015), who instead focus on monotonicity properties.
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and W , it is possible to get V -anonymous, W -neutral and resolute spcs even when no anonymous,
neutral and resolute spc exists2. That implies that, in a situation where only suitable weak versions
of anonymity and neutrality are sensible, there may be room for finding a resolute spc satisfying
such versions of anonymity and neutrality, possibly being the refinement of a given spc.
In this paper we propose conditions on V and W which are necessary and sufficient to make a
V -anonymous andW -neutral spc admit a V -anonymous andW -neutral resolute refinement. Those
conditions are summarized by an arithmetical relation between the size |W | of W and a special
number γpV q associated with V (defined in (12)). Namely, given a V -anonymous and W -neutral
spc C (like, for instance, the Borda, the Copeland, the Minimax and the Kemeny spcs which
are anonymous and neutral and then V -anonymous and W -neutral), we have that C admits a
V -anonymous and W -neutral resolute refinement if and only if3
gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1 (1)
(Theorem 17). The computation of the numbers γpV q and |W | is, in principle, hard. Fortunately,
it becomes easy for many subgroups of interest in the applications (see Section 8). For example,
consider a situation where individuals can be divided into disjoint subcommittees, say H1, . . . , Hr,
where individuals have the same decision power and that alternatives can be divided into disjoint
subclasses, say N1, . . . , Ns, where alternatives have the same exogenous importance. Assume first
that such subcommittees (subclasses) can be ranked is such a way that, for every pair of subcom-
mittees (subclasses), each individual (alternative) belonging to the subcommittee (subclass) having
higher rank is more influential (more important) than any individual (alternative) belonging to the
other subcommittee (subclass)4. In this case, it is natural to require a collective decision process
not to distinguish among individuals (alternatives) belonging to the same subcommittee (subclass).
Thus, two groups V and W naturally arise: V is given by those permutations of individual names
mapping every Hi into itself; W is given by those permutations of alternative names mapping every
Nj into itself. Clearly |W | “
śs
j“1 |Nj|! and it can be shown that
γpV q “ gcdp|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q, (2)
so that condition (1) becomes5
gcd
˜
|H1|, . . . , |Hr|,
sź
j“1
|Nj |!
¸
“ 1. (3)
Assume now that subclasses can be ranked as before while no ranking of subcommittees is available.
However, it is known that subcommittees having the same size must have the same impact in the
final decision. This particular situation leads to consider a collective decision process which does
not distinguish among individuals (alternatives) belonging to the same subcommittee (subclass)
and also does not distinguish among subcommittees having the same size. Thus, V is now given by
those permutations of individual names mapping every Hi into one of the subcommittee having its
same size (possibly itself), while W is the same as before. We prove then that
γpV q “ gcdp|H1|t1, . . . , |Hr|trq,
2For instance, in the trivial case where V and W are singletons whose unique element is the identity permutation,
every resolute spc is V -anonymous and W -neutral.
3Throughout the paper, given integers x1, . . . , xs, for some s P N, we denote by gcdpx1, . . . , xsq their greatest
common divisor and by lcmpx1, . . . , xsq their least common multiple.
4The presence of a president or gender discrimination previously mentioned are special instances.
5Note that anonymity corresponds to a have H as a unique subcommittee and neutrality corresponds to a have
N as a unique subclass. In this special case (3) reduces to the already commented condition gcdph, n!q “ 1.
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where ti counts the number of subcommittees of size |Hi|, so that condition (1) becomes
gcd
˜
|H1|t1, . . . , |Hr|tr,
sź
j“1
|Nj |!
¸
“ 1.
We further deepen the analysis of the resolute refinements of a given spc by considering the
property of reversal symmetry, a property first introduced by Saari (1994). Recall that the reversal
of a ranking of alternatives is the ranking obtained by making the best alternative the worst, the
second best alternative the second worst, and so on, and that a spc is said reversal symmetric if, for
any pair of preference profiles such that one is obtained by the other by reversing each individual
preference, it associates with one of them a set of social preferences if and only if it associates with
the other one the set of their reversal. We prove that the condition
gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1, (4)
along with other technical conditions, is necessary and sufficient to make any V -anonymous, W -
neutral and reversal symmetric spc admit a V -anonymous, W -neutral and reversal symmetric
resolute refinement (Theorem 18). In particular, from that result, it is easily deduced that the
Borda and the Copeland spcs admit a V -anonymous, W -neutral and reversal symmetric resolute
refinement if and only if (4) holds true.
Of course, the study of the resolute refinements and their properties is meaningful also in other
frameworks. For such a reason we follow up on this issue focusing on the so-called k-multiwinner
social choice correspondences (k-sccs), that is, those procedures which associate with any preference
profile a family of sets of k alternatives to be interpreted as the family of all the sets of alternatives
that can be considered the best k alternatives for the society. This framework, which extends the
classical and well-established single winner framework (corresponding to the case k “ 1), has been
explored for about thirty years and constitutes nowadays an interesting and growing research area.
We refer to the recent papers by Elkind et al. (2017) and Faliszewski et al. (2017) for further
information on that topic.
We study the problem to determine whether a k-scc admits V -anonymous and W -neutral
resolute refinements6 and whether some of them are immune to the reversal bias too. Recall that
a k-scc is immune to the reversal bias if it never associates the same singleton with a preference
profile and its reversal (see Saari and Barney, 2003, and Bubboloni and Gori, 2016a). We prove
that if (1) holds true, then any V -anonymous and W -neutral k-scc admits a V -anonymous and
W -neutral resolute refinement (Theorem 20). Assuming (4), we also find out conditions to make
every V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune to the reversal bias k-scc admit a resolute refinement
having the same properties (Theorem 21). Remarkably, that analysis put in evidence the role played
by the number k of selected alternatives and the number n of alternatives pointing out that the
existence of an immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement is guaranteed when the pair pn, kq
belongs to a specific set7.
We emphasize that the methods developed in the paper also allow to deal with situations in
which forms of symmetry conceptually different from V -anonymity and W -neutrality are required.
To that purpose we examine, in detail, the case of a committee facing the problem of electing
a subcommittee of size k among n members of the committee who run as candidates. In this
particular situation, a collective decision process should make no distinction among individuals
who are candidates and among individuals who are not candidates and, at the same time, it must
carefully take into account the fact that the alternatives to choose from are now a subset of the
6Those concepts are easily adapted to k-sccs. See Section 4.
7We stress that equality in (2) along with the described results about k-sccs (Theorem 20 and 21) imply as an
immediate consequence the main result in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b), namely Theorem 8 therein.
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set of individuals. In Section 8.3, we prove that if gcdph, nq “ 1, then any anonymous and neutral
k-scc admits a resolute refinement consistent with the above described requirements.
Note that, at least in the single winner case, two special resolute refinements are sometimes
used. They are built using two simple methods to break ties. The first method, proposed by
Moulin (1988), is based on a tie-breaking agenda, that is, an exogenously given ranking of the
alternatives: in ambiguity case, it is chosen the alternative of the social outcome which is best
ranked in the agenda. The second one is instead based on the preferences of one of the individuals
appointed as tie-breaker: in ambiguity case, it is chosen the alternative of the social outcome which
is best ranked by the tie-breaker. Of course, the resolute refinements built through a tie-breaking
agenda fail in general to be neutral while the one built through a tie-breaker fail in general to be
anonymous. Our work allows to cast these two special types of tie-breaking rules within a more
general theory (Section 8).8
Note also that some contributions dealing with weak versions of anonymity and neutrality are
present in the literature. Assuming there are only two alternatives, Perry and Powers (2008) calcu-
late the number of resolute spcs that are anonymous and neutral and the number of spcs satisfying
a weak version of anonymity (that is, all individuals but one are anonymous) and neutrality; Powers
(2010) shows that a spc satisfies the previously described weak anonymity, neutrality and Maskin
monotonicity if and only if it is close to spc obeying an absolute qualified majority; Quesada (2013)
identifies seven axioms (among which are weak versions of anonymity and neutrality) characteriz-
ing the rules that are either the relative majority rule or the relative majority rule where a given
individual can break the ties; Campbell and Kelly (2011, 2013) show that the relative majority is
implied both by a suitable weak version of anonymity, neutrality and monotonicity, as well as by
limited neutrality, anonymity and monotonicity. In the general case for the number of alternatives,
some observations about different levels of anonymity and neutrality can be found in the paper
by Kelly (1991). Bubboloni and Gori (2015, 2016b) consider, only for 1-sccs, weak versions of
anonymity and neutrality, determined by partitions of individuals and alternatives. More recently,
a wide literature about k-sccs which are representation-focused on some attributes of the alterna-
tives (sex, age, profession, ethnicity) has been growing. See, for instance, Lang and Skowron (2016),
Bredereck et al. (2017), Celis et al. (2018).
The techniques used in the paper are based on the algebraic approach focused on the theory
of finite permutation groups and the notion of action of a group on a set9 proposed by Eg˘eciog˘lu
(2009) and Eg˘eciog˘lu and Giritligil (2013) for analysing the set of preference profiles and later
developed by Bubboloni and Gori (2014, 2015, 2016b), which we mainly refer to, and Dog˘an and
Giritligil (2015). However, generalizing the ideas and results in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, 2016b)
for managing the problem of finding resolute refinements of spcs and k-scc is in no way a trivial
adaptation. On the contrary, some proofs require complex and tricky arguments and, in particular,
a deep consideration of the concept of regular group, first introduced in Bubboloni and Gori (2015),
is needed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2-4 we give the definitions, the notation and
the basic results needed to understand the model. In Section 5 the main results are stated and
developed. Section 6 is devoted to a careful analysis of the concept of regular group. Section 7
explores V -anonymity and W -neutrality as an application of the main results of the general theory.
Section 8 is about some concrete applications of V -anonymity and W -neutrality, as described in
this introduction. Finally, appendices A and B contain the proofs of the main results.
8Some remarks about the tie-breaking agenda and the role of the tie-breaker are proposed in Dog˘an and Giritligil
(2015) and Bubboloni and Gori (2016b), where the problem of finding resolute refinements of 1-sccs is considered.
9It is worth mentioning that Kelly (1991) discusses the role of symmetry in the arrovian framework through suitable
subgroups of the symmetric group. Within the topological approach to social choices developed by Chichilnisky
(1980), several algebraic concepts, in particular that of symmetric group, are crucial for proving many results.
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2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we assume 0 R N and we set N0 “ N Y t0u. For k P N, the set t1, . . . , ku is
denoted by vkw. Given a finite set X we denote by |X | its size. A subset of X of size k is called a
k-subset of X . We denote by PpXq the set of the subsets of X and by PkpXq the set of the k-subsets
of X .
2.1 Relations
Let X be a nonempty and finite set. A relation on X is a subset of X2. The set of the relations
on X is denoted by RpXq. Fix R P RpXq. Given x, y P X , we usually write x ľR y instead of
px, yq P R and x ąR y instead of px, yq P R and py, xq R R. We say that R is complete if, for every
x, y P X , x ľR y or y ľR x; reflexive if, for every x P X , x ľR x; irreflexive if, for every x P X ,
x ńR x; antisymmetric if, for every x, y P X , x ľR y and y ľR x imply x “ y; asymmetric if, for
every x, y P X , x ľR y implies y ńR x; transitive if, for every x, y, z P X , x ľR y and y ľR z
imply x ľR z; acyclic if, for every sequence x1, . . . , xs of s ě 2 distinct elements of X such that
xi ľR xi`1 for all i P vs ´ 1w, we have that xs ńR x1. It is well-known that if R is transitive
and irreflexive (antisymmetric, asymmetric), then R is acyclic. Complete and transitive relations
on X are called orders on X . The set of orders on X is denoted by OpXq. Complete, transitive
and antisymmetric relations on X are called linear orders on X . The set of linear orders on X is
denoted by LpXq.
2.2 Groups, permutations and relations
In the paper we make use of basic finite group theory and use standard notation. Our general
reference is Jacobson (1974). For completeness we give here the main notions and notation we are
going to use. Let G be a finite group. Given g P G we denote by |g| the order of g. If U is a
subgroup of G, we use the notation U ď G. Given g, v P G and U ď G, the conjugate of g by v
is gv “ vgv´1 and the conjugate of U by v is the subgroup Uv “ tgv P G : g P Uu. We say that
g1, g2 P G are conjugate if there exists v P G such that g2 “ g
v
1 . The group constituted only by the
neutral element is called the trivial group.
Let n P N. The set of bijective functions from vnw to itself is denoted by Sn. Sn is a group
with product defined, for every σ1, σ2 P Sn, by the composition
10 σ1σ2 P Sn. The neutral element
of Sn is given by the identity function on vnw, denoted by id. Sn is called the symmetric group on
vnw and its elements are called permutations. A permutation σ P Snztidu is the product of disjoint
cycles of lengths greater than or equal to 2 uniquely determined by σ, up to reordering, and called
the constituents of σ. The order reversing permutation in Sn is the permutation ρ0 P Sn defined,
for every r P vnw, as ρ0prq “ n ´ r ` 1. Obviously, we have |ρ0| “ 2 and thus Ω “ tid, ρ0u is a
subgroup of Sn. Note that ρ0 has exactly one fixed point when n is odd and no fixed point when
n is even. Note also that Ω is an abelian group which admits as unique subgroups tidu and Ω.
Let σ P Sn. Given W P Ppvnwq, we denote the image of W through σ by σW (instead of
σpW q). Moreover, given W Ď Ppvnwq, we define σW “ tσW P Ppvnwq : W P Wu. Note that,
for every σ1, σ2 P Sn, W P Ppvnwq and W Ď Ppvnwq, we have that pσ2σ1qW “ σ2pσ1W q and
pσ2σ1qW “ σ2pσ1Wq. Thus brackets can be omitted in this type of writings. Given R P Rpvnwq, we
set
σR “
 
pσpxq, σpyqq P vnw2 : px, yq P R
(
, Rρ0 “
 
py, xq P vnw2 : px, yq P R
(
, (5)
and R id “ R. In other words, for every x, y P vnw, x ľR y if and only if σpxq ľσR σpyq; x ľR y if
10Given A, B and C sets and f : A Ñ B and g : B Ñ C functions, we denote by gf the right-to-left composition
of f and g, that is, the function from A to C defined, for every a P A, as gfpaq “ gpfpaqq.
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and only if y ľRρ0 x. Given Q Ď Rpvnwq and ρ P Ω, we also set
σQ “ tσR P Rpvnwq : R P Qu, Qρ “ tRρ P Rpvnwq : R P Qu.
Note that, for every σ1, σ2 P Sn, ρ1, ρ2 P Ω, R P Rpvnwq and Q Ď Rpvnwq, we have that pσ2σ1qR “
σ2pσ1Rq, Rpρ1ρ2q “ pRρ1qρ2, pσ1Rqρ1 “ σ1pRρ1q and pσ2σ1qQ “ σ2pσ1Qq, Qpρ1ρ2q “ pQρ1qρ2,
pσ1Qqρ1 “ σ1pQρ1q. Those properties allow to avoid brackets when writing such kinds of products.
3 Preference relations and preference profiles
From now on, let n P N with n ě 2 be fixed, and let N “ vnw be the set of names of alternatives.
A preference relation on N is a linear order on N . Let q P LpNq be a preference relation. If
x, y P N are alternatives, we interpret the writing x ľq y by saying that x is at least as good as y
(according to q), and the writing x ąq y by saying that x is preferred to y (according to q). Note
that, since q is a linear order, x ąq y is equivalent to x ‰ y and x ľq y. It is well-known that
there exists a unique numbering x1, x2, . . . , xn of the distinct elements in N such that, once set
R “ tpxi, xi`1q P N
2 : i P t1, . . . , n ´ 1uu P RpNq, we have q Ě R and q is the only linear order
containing the relation R. Thus, we can completely identify q with its subset R, which we write in
the form x1 ąq x2 ąq ¨ ¨ ¨ ąq xn. We refer to r as the rank of xr in q. Since the map from vnw to vnw
which associates with any r P vnw the alternative xr is a bijection and thus an element of Sn, we also
have that q is completely identified with such permutation, which we continue to call q. Explicitly,
if q is interpreted in Sn, then qprq “ xr for all r P vnw. In this way, we have established a well-known
and remarkable identification of LpNq with Sn. Note now that if ψ P Sn, then the relations ψq
and qρ0, as defined in (5), are the linear orders given by ψpx1q ąψq ψpx2q ąψq ¨ ¨ ¨ ąψq ψpxnq and
xn ąqρ0 xn´1 ąqρ0 ¨ ¨ ¨ ąqρ0 x1. In particular, for every ψ P Sn and ρ P Ω, ψq and qρ can be
interpreted as products of permutations in the symmetric group Sn. As a consequence, thanks to
the cancellation law in Sn, we have that, for every ψ1, ψ2 P Sn and ρ1, ρ2 P Ω, ψ1q “ ψ2q implies
ψ1 “ ψ2 and qρ1 “ qρ2 implies ρ1 “ ρ2. Moreover, by elementary properties of the symmetric
group, we have that ψLpNqρ “ LpNq for all ψ P Sn and ρ P Ω.
From now on, let h P N with h ě 2 be fixed, and let H “ vhw be the set of names of individuals.
A preference profile is an element of LpNqh. The set LpNqh is denoted by P . If p P P and i P H ,
the i-th component pi of p represents the preferences of individual i.
Let us set now
G “ Sh ˆ Sn ˆ Ω.
Then G is a group through component-wise multiplication, that is, defining, for every pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q P
G and pϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q P G, pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1qpϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q “ pϕ1ϕ2, ψ1ψ2, ρ1ρ2q. For every pϕ, ψ, ρq P G and
p P P , define ppϕ,ψ,ρq P P as the preference profile such that, for every i P H ,
pppϕ,ψ,ρqqi “ ψpϕ´1piqρ. (6)
Thus, the preference profile ppϕ,ψ,ρq is obtained by p according to the following rules (to be applied
in any order): for every i P H , individual i is renamed ϕpiq; for every x P N , alternative x is
renamed ψpxq; for every r P vnw, alternatives whose rank is r are moved to rank ρprq.
For further details and examples on these issues the reader is referred to Bubboloni and Gori
(2016b, Sec. 2.2 and 2.3).
4 Social preference and social choice correspondences
A social preference correspondence (spc) is a correspondence from P to LpNq. The set of the spcs
is denoted by P. Thus, if C P P and p P P , then Cppq is a subset of LpNq.
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From now on, let k P vn´ 1w be fixed. A k-multiwinner social choice correspondence (k-scc) is
a correspondence from P to PkpNq. The set of the k-sccs is denoted by Ck. Thus, if C P Ck and
p P P , then Cppq is a set of k-subsets of N .
We say that C P P (C P Ck) is decisive if, for every p P P , Cppq ‰ ∅; resolute if, for every p P P ,
|Cppq| “ 1. We say that C 1 P P (C 1 P Ck) is a refinement of C P P (C P Ck) if, for every p P P ,
C 1ppq Ď Cppq. Of course, C admits a resolute refinement if and only if C is decisive; C admits a
unique resolute refinement if and only if C is resolute.
Let U be a subgroup of G. We say that C P P is U -symmetric if, for every p P P and
pϕ, ψ, ρq P U ,
Cpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψCppqρ; (7)
we say that C P P (C P Ck) is U -consistent if, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U ,
Cpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψCppq if ρ “ id, (8)
Cpppϕ,ψ,ρqq ‰ ψCppq if ρ “ ρ0 and |Cppq| “ 1. (9)
We stress that the writings in (7), (8) and (9) are meaningful due to the definitions of products
between permutations and sets (sets of sets, relations, sets of relations) and their properties de-
scribed in Section 2.2. The set of U -symmetric spcs is denoted by P˚U ; the set of U -consistent spcs
(k-sccs) is denoted by PU (CUk ). Observe that we do not introduce the concept of U -symmetry for
k-sccs. Note also that, if U 1 ď U ď G, then P˚U Ď P˚U
1
, PU Ď PU
1
and CUk Ď C
U 1
k . Some basic
links between the concepts of symmetry and consistency are given by the following proposition
whose proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let U ď G. Then the following facts hold true:
piq P˚U Ď PU .
piiq If U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, then P
˚U “ PU .
The concepts of symmetry and consistency with respect to a subgroupU ofG include some classic
requirements for spcs (k-sccs). Indeed, we have that C P P (C P Ck) is anonymous if and only if it
is Shˆtiduˆtidu-consistent; C P P (C P Ck) is neutral if and only if it is tiduˆSnˆtidu-consistent;
C P P (C P Ck) is immune to the reversal bias if and only if it is tiduˆtiduˆΩ-consistent; C P P is
reversal symmetric if and only if it is tiduˆ tiduˆΩ-symmetric. Moreover, any combination of the
properties above mentioned can be interpreted in terms of U -symmetry or U -consistency where the
subgroup U of G is naturally built as described by the next propositions. Their proof is given in
Appendix A. In what follows, given U1 and U2 subgroups of G, we denote by xU1, U2y the subgroup
of G generated by U1 and U2
11.
Proposition 2. Let U1, U2 ď G. Then P
˚U2 XP˚U2 “ P˚xU1,U2y.
Proposition 3. Let U1, U2 ď G such that, for every i P t1, 2u, Ui “ ZiˆRi for some Zi ď ShˆSn
and Ri ď Ω. Then P
U1 XPU2 “ PxU1,U2y and CU1k X C
U2
k “ C
xU1,U2y
k .
In particular, C P P is anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric if and only if C is G-
symmetric; C P P (C P Ck) is anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias if and only
if C is G-consistent. Classical spcs provide examples of spcs which are G-symmetric or at least
Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu-symmetric. For instance, the Borda and the Copeland spcs are G-symmetric while
the Minimax spc is generally only Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu-symmetric.
12 Note also that the spc associating
with every p P P the set LpNq is surely G-symmetric. Such a spc is called the trivial spc.
11See Jacobson (1974, Section 1.5).
12See Bubboloni and Gori (2016b).
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We finally observe that there is a natural way to construct a k-scc starting from a spc. Indeed,
given C P P, we consider the k-scc Ck defined, for every p P P , by
Ckppq “
!
tqprq : 1 ď r ď ku P PkpNq : q P Cppq
)
.
Note that tqprq : 1 ď r ď ku is the set of alternatives ranked by q in the first k positions. Ck is
called the k-scc induced by C. Of course, given C P P, C is decisive if and only if Ck is decisive; if
C is resolute, then Ck is resolute. Moreover if C
1 P P is a refinement of C, then C 1k is a refinement
of Ck. The following proposition, whose proof is in Appendix A, expresses the main basic property
of the induced k-scc with respect to symmetry.
Proposition 4. Let U ď G. If C P P˚U , then Ck P C
U
k .
In particular, the k-sccs induced by the Borda, the Copeland and the trivial spcs are G-
consistent, while the Minimax k-scc is ShˆSnˆtidu-consistent. Note also that the k-scc induced
by the trivial spc, associates with every p P P the set of all the possible k-subsets of N .
4.1 Social methods
Let us introduce now a final new concept which will be very important in the sequel. A social
method is a function from P to RpNq. The set of social methods is denoted by M. Let R P M.
We say that R is acyclic (transitive, complete etc.) if, for every p P P , the relation Rppq is acyclic
(transitive, complete etc.). The spc associated with R, denoted by CR, is defined, for every p P P ,
by
CRppq “ tq P LpNq : Rppq Ď qu.
Note that, by the well-known Szpilrajn’s extension theorem, CR is decisive if and only if R is acyclic.
Given U ď G, we say that R is U -symmetric if, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U ,
Rpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψRppqρ.
We stress that the above writing is meaningful due to the definitions of products between permu-
tations and relations described in Section 2.2. The set of U -symmetric social methods is denoted
by M˚U .
Note that if U 1 ď U and R is U -symmetric, then R is also U 1-symmetric. Moreover, as proved
in Appendix A, the next propositions hold true.
Proposition 5. Let U ď G. If R P M˚U , then CR P P˚U .
Proposition 6. Let U1, U2 ď G. Then M
˚U1 XM˚U2 “M˚xU1,U2y.
As an example, consider the social method R defined, for every p P P , by
Rppq “ tpx, yq P N2 : @i P H, x ąpi yu,
and note that R P M˚G. The spc associated with is called the Pareto spc and, as well-known, is
decisive. The k-scc induced by the Pareto spc is called the Pareto k-scc. By Proposition 5, the
Pareto spc is G-symmetric and, by Proposition 4, the Pareto k-scc is G-consistent.
5 Main results
Given a spc or a k-scc, our main purpose is to find a resolute refinement of it satisfying suitable
symmetry and consistency properties. More precisely, we try to find an answer to the next three
questions:
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• Given a spc C and U ď G, can we find a resolute refinement of C which is U -symmetric?
• Given a spc C and U ď G, can we find a resolute refinement of C which is U -consistent?
• Given a k-scc C and U ď G, can we find a resolute refinement of C which is U -consistent?
Indeed, for each of the above questions, we provide conditions on C and U which allow to give an
affirmative answer. We emphasize that, assuming C to be trivial, the three questions above are
about the existence of resolute U -symmetric spcs, U -consistent spcs and U -consistent k-sccs.
In order to describe our main results, we need to recall the crucial concept of regular subgroup
of G, introduced in Bubboloni and Gori (2015). A subgroup U of G is said to be regular if, for
every p P P , there exists ψ˚ P Sn conjugate to ρ0 such that
StabU ppq Ď pSh ˆ tidu ˆ tiduq Y pSh ˆ tψ˚u ˆ tρ0uq . (10)
where StabU ppq “ tpϕ, ψ, ρq P U : p
pϕ,ψ,ρq “ pu.
We also recall the fundamental result about those groups proved in Bubboloni and Gori (2015,
Theorem 7):
There exists a U -symmetric resolute spc if and only if U is regular. (11)
Thus, if we want to focus on U -symmetric resolute refinements of a given spc, we necessarily have to
assume U regular. The next result follows from some technical adjustments of the proof of Theorem
11 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015). Its proof is proposed in Appendix B.
Theorem 7. Let U be a regular subgroup of G and C be a decisive and U -symmetric spc. Then
the three following conditions are equivalent:
piq C admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement;
piiq there exists an irreflexive and acyclic U -symmetric social method R such that CR refines C;
piiiq there exists an irreflexive and acyclic social method R such that CR refines C and the following
condition is satisfied:
paq for every p P P, x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabU ppq, we have that px, yq P Rppq if and
only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P Rppq.
Note that, for every U ď G, there are decisive and U -symmetric spcs. Indeed, the trivial, the
Pareto, the Borda and the Kemeny spcs are decisive and G-symmetric so that they are U -symmetric
too.
Corollary 8. Let U be a regular subgroup of G with U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu and C be a decisive and
U -symmetric spc. Then C admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement.
Proof. For every p P P , we have Cppq ‰ ∅. Pick qp P Cppq and define R : P Ñ RpNq setting,
for every p P P , Rppq “ qpz∆, where ∆ “ tpx, xq : x P Nu. Then R is an irreflexive and acyclic
social method. Moreover, CRppq “ tq P LpNq : qpz∆ Ď qu “ tqpu, so that C
R refines C. Since paq
trivially holds, we have that condition (iii) in Theorem 7 is satisfied. Therefore, by Theorem 7, C
admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement.
The concept of regular group works properly even to analyse consistency. Theorems 9 below is
proved in Appendix B by widely extending the theory developed in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) to
the framework here considered.
Theorem 9. Let U be a regular subgroup of G and C be a decisive and U -consistent spc. Then C
admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
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Theorems 10 below, also proved in Appendix B, is a largely unexpected result. It establishes a
deep link between the number n of alternatives and the number k of winners to be selected in order
to make each decisive and U -consistent k-scc admit a U -consistent resolute refinement. It points
out that there is a substantial difference between spcs and k-sccs with respect to the existence
of U -consistent resolute refinements. Indeed, while for spcs such existence is guaranteed for every
U -consistent spc C once U is regular (Theorem 9), for k-sccs one has to require the fulfilment of
further conditions in addition to the regularity of U .
Theorem 10. Let U be a regular subgroup of G. Then the two following facts are equivalent:
piq every decisive and U -consistent k-scc admits a U -consistent resolute refinement;
piiq one of the following conditions is satisfied:
paq for every pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P U , ψ is not a conjugate of ρ0,
pbq n ď 3,
pcq k P t1, n´ 1u,
pdq n is even and k is odd.
Since condition paq in Theorem 10 certainly holds when U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, we easily obtain
the following useful consequence.
Corollary 11. Let U be a regular subgroup of G, with U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, and C be a decisive
and U -consistent k-scc. Then C admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Observe that condition paq in Theorem 10 can be satisfied also by regular subgroups not included
in Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu. Consider the group tidu ˆ tidu ˆ Ω and note that, for every p P P , StabU ppq “
tpid, id, idqu13. Thus tidu ˆ tidu ˆ Ω is regular and, since id is not conjugate to ρ0, paq trivially
holds.
We end the section by stating some simple results about the induced k-sccs.
Proposition 12. Let U be a regular subgroup of G, with U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, and C be a decisive
and U -consistent spc. Then the induced k-scc Ck admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Proof. Since U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, we have that C is U -symmetric and thus, by Proposition 4,
Ck is a decisive U -consistent k-scc. Thus, by Corollary 11, Ck admits a U -consistent resolute
refinement.
Proposition 13. Let U ď G and C be a decisive spc. If C admits a resolute U -symmetric
refinement, then U is regular and the induced k-scc Ck admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Proof. Let f be a resolute U -symmetric refinement of C. By (11), U is regular. Moreover, by
Proposition 4, fk is U -consistent. On the other hand, clearly, fk is resolute and refines Ck.
6 Regular groups
Because of the results presented in Section 5, the importance of the regular subgroups of G is
evident. In this section we propose some theorems which provide a way to test whether a subgroup
U of G of the type V ˆW ˆtidu or V ˆW ˆΩ, with V ď Sh and W ď Sn, is regular or not. These
types of groups are particularly relevant for applications. Regular groups of a different structure
will be treated in Section 8.3.
13 Indeed ppid,id,ρ0q “ p implies p1ρ0 “ p1, which by cancellation law in the symmetric group, gives the contra-
diction ρ0 “ id.
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We start with some preliminary definitions. Letm P N be fixed in this section. Consider σ P Sm.
For every x P vmw, the σ-orbit xxσy of x is defined by xxσy “ tσtpxq P vmw : t P Nu. It is well-known
that |xxσy| “ s where s “ mintt P N : σtpxq “ xu. If x is fixed by σ, then xxσy “ txu. If instead x
is moved by σ and the constituent of σ moving x is the cycle px1 ¨ ¨ ¨xsq, then x
xσy “ tx1, . . . , xsu.
The set Opσq “ txxσy : x P vmwu of the σ-orbits is a partition of vmw, and we denote its size by
rpσq. A system of representatives of the σ-orbits is a set tx1, . . . , xrpσqu P Prpσqpvmwq such that
Opσq “ tx
xσy
1
, . . . , x
xσy
rpσqu.
Next we recall the well-known number theoretical concept of partition. A partition of m is an
unordered list T “ rm1, . . . ,mrs where r P N, for every j P t1, . . . , ru, mj P N and m “
řr
j“1mj .
The numbers m1, . . . ,mr are called the terms of T . The set of partitions of m is denoted by Πm.
Consider T P Πm and assume that T admits s P N distinct terms, saym1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă ms, and assume
that, for every j P vsw, mj appears tj ě 1 times in T . Then we use the notation T “ rm
t1
1
, ...,mtss s
(where tj is omitted when it equals 1). We say that rm
t1
1
, ...,mtss s is the normal form of T and that
tj is the multiplicity of mj . For instance, r2, 1, 3, 1s P Π7 has normal form r1
2, 2, 3s. We recall the
well-known surjective function
T : Sm Ñ Πm, σ ÞÑ T pσq “
”
|x
xσy
1
|, . . . , |x
xσy
rpσq|
ı
,
where tx1, . . . , xrpσqu P Prpσqpvmwq is a system of representatives of the σ-orbits. For every σ P Sm,
T pσq is called the type of σ. In other words T pσq is the unordered list of the sizes of the orbits
of the group generated by σ on the set vmw. Note that the number of terms equal to 1 in T pσq
counts the fixed points of σ while the number of terms different from 1 counts the constituents of
σ. Moreover, |σ| “ lcmpT pσqq. For instance, if σ “ p123qp456qp78q P S9, then rpσq “ 4, the type of
σ is T pσq “ r1, 2, 3, 3s P Π9, |σ| “ lcmr1, 2, 3, 3s “ 6 and a system of representatives of the σ-orbits
is t1, 4, 7, 9u P P4pv9wq. The theoretical importance of the concept of type relies on the fact that
two permutations are conjugate if and only if they have the same type.
Given U ď Sm, we define the type number of U by
γpUq “ lcmtgcdpT pσqq : σ P Uu. (12)
We describe some basic properties of the type number after having introduced some arithmetic
notation. Let x, y P N. If x divides y, we write x | y. If π P N is a prime number we denote by
xπ “ maxtπ
a : a P N0, π
a | xu the π-part of x.
Lemma 14. Let U, V ď Sm. Then the following facts hold true.
piq If U ď V , then γpUq | γpV q.
piiq γpUq | m.
piiiq If U contains an m-cycle, then γpUq “ m. In particular, γpSmq “ m.
Proof. piq The set of integers tgcdpT pσqq : σ P Uu is included in the set of integers tgcdpT pσqq : σ P
V u and thus the least common multiple of the first divides that of the second.
piiq Let σ P U and let T pσq “ rm1, . . . ,mrs. If d “ gcdpT pσqq, we have that d | mj for all
j P vrw and since
řr
j“1mj “ m we have d | m. Thus m is a common multiple for the integers in
tgcdpT pσqq : σ P Uu, which implies γpUq | m.
piiiq Let σ P U be an m-cycle. Then T pσq “ rms and gcdpT pσqq “ m. Thus m | γpUq. Since by
piiq we also have γpUq | m we conclude that γpUq “ m.
Theorem 15. Let V ď Sh and W ď Sn. Then V ˆW ˆ tidu is regular if and only if
gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1.
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Proof. Let U “ V ˆW ˆ tidu. Assume first that gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1. Assume further, by con-
tradiction, that U is not regular. Then, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015), there exist
pϕ, ψ, idq P U and a prime π such that |ψ|π ą 1 and |ψ|π | gcdpT pϕqq. Then π | γpV q and, by
Lagrange Theorem, π | |W | so that π | gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1, a contradiction.
Assume next that U is regular. We show that if π is a prime dividing |W |, then π ∤ γpV q. Let
π | |W |. Then, by Cauchy Theorem, there exists ψ P W with |ψ| “ π. But, for every ϕ P V , we
have pϕ, ψ, idq P U and, of course, |ψ|π “ π. Thus, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015),
we have that, for every ϕ P V , π ∤ gcdpT pϕqq so that π ∤ lcmtgcdpT pϕqq : ϕ P V u “ γpV q.
Theorem 16. Let V ď Sh and W ď Sn. Then V ˆW ˆ Ω is regular if and only if
gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1.
Proof. Let U “ V ˆ W ˆ Ω. Assume first that gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1. Assume further,
by contradiction, that U is not regular. Then, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015),
there exist pϕ, ψ, idq P U and a prime π such that |ψ|π ą 1 and |ψ|π | gcdpT pϕqq, or there exist
pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P U , with ψ
2 “ id and ψ not conjugate of ρ0, such that 2 | gcdpT pϕqq. In the first case,
by Lagrange Theorem, we have π | |W | as well as π | γpV q and thus π | gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “
1, a contradiction. In the second case we have 2 | γpV q, which implies the contradiction 2 |
gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1.
Assume next that U is regular. We show first that if π is a prime dividing |W |, then π ∤ γpV q.
Let π | |W |. Then, by Cauchy Theorem, there exists ψ PW with |ψ| “ π. But, for every ϕ P V , we
have pϕ, ψ, idq P U and, of course, |ψ|π “ π. Thus, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015),
we get π ∤ gcdpT pϕqq and so also π ∤ lcmtgcdpT pϕqq : ϕ P V u “ γpV q. We are then left with proving
that 2 ∤ γpV q, that is, that 2 ∤ gcdpT pϕqq for all ϕ P V . Let ϕ P V and consider pϕ, id, ρ0q P U.
Since id2 “ id but id is not a conjugate of ρ0, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015), we
get 2 ∤ gcdpT pϕqq.
7 Generalized anonymity and neutrality
Consider V ď Sh and W ď Sn. Given C P P (C P Ck), we say that C is V -anonymous if C is
V ˆtiduˆtidu-consistent;W -neutral if C is tiduˆW ˆtidu-consistent. Thus, C is V -anonymous if
permuting individual names according to permutations in V has no effect on the final outcome; C
is W -neutral if the unique effect of permuting alternative names according to a permutation in W
is that alternative names are accordingly permuted in the final outcome. Note that, the concepts of
Sh-anonymity and Sn-neutrality correspond to the classical concepts of anonymity and neutrality,
respectively. Note also that every C P P (C P Ck) is tidu-anonymous and tidu-neutral.
We also stress that, by Propositions 2 and 3, C P P (C P Ckq is V -anonymous and W -neutral if
and only if C is V ˆW ˆtidu-consistent; C P P is V -anonymous,W -neutral and reversal symmetric
if and only if C is V ˆW ˆΩ-symmetric; C P P (C P Ckq is V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune
to the reversal bias if and only if C is V ˆW ˆ Ω-consistent.
Below we provide some simple but very important consequences of the theory developed in the
previous sections.
Theorem 17. Let V ď Sh, W ď Sn and C be a decisive, V -anonymous and W -neutral spc. Then
the two following conditions are equivalent:
piq C admits a V -anonymous and W -neutral resolute refinement;
piiq gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1.
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Proof. piq ñ piiq. Assume that piq holds true. Then by (11), we have that the group V ˆW ˆ tidu
is regular, so that, by Theorem 15, gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1.
piiq ñ piq. Assume that piiq holds true. Then, by Theorem 15, the group V ˆW ˆ tidu is
regular. Then we can apply Theorem 9.
Note that condition gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1 above is trivially satisfied if one between V and W
is trivial. Observe also that the above theorem generalizes the classic result about the existence
of a resolute anonymous and neutral spc. Namely, taking V “ Sh, W “ Sn and using Lemma
14 piiiq, we immediately have that there exists a resolute, anonymous and neutral spc if and only
if gcdph, n!q “ 1.
Theorem 18. Let V ď Sh, W ď Sn and C be a decisive, V -anonymous, W -neutral and reversal
symmetric spc. Then the two following conditions are equivalent:
piq C admits a V -anonymous, W -neutral and reversal symmetric resolute refinement;
piiq gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1 and there exists an irreflexive acyclic social method R such that
CR refines C and, for U “ V ˆW ˆ Ω, the following condition is satisfied:
paq for every p P P, x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabUppq, we have that px, yq P Rppq if and
only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P Rppq.
Proof. piq ñ piiq. Assume that piq holds true. Then by (11), we have that the group U is regular,
so that, by Theorem 16, gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1. Moreover, using now Theorem 7 we conclude
the proof.
piiq ñ piq. Assume that piiq holds true. Then, by Theorem 16, we know that the group U is
regular. Therefore we can apply Theorem 7.
Theorem 19. Let V ď Sh, W ď Sn and C be a decisive, V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune
to the reversal bias spc. If gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1, then C admits a V -anonymous, W -neutral
and immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement.
Proof. By Theorem 16, the group U “ V ˆW ˆ Ω is regular. Then Theorem 9 applies.
Theorem 20. Let V ď Sh, W ď Sn and C be a decisive, V -anonymous and W -neutral k-scc. If
gcdpγpV q, |W |q “ 1, then C admits a V -anonymous and W -neutral resolute refinement.
Proof. Apply Theorem 15 and Corollary 11.
Theorem 21. Let V ď Sh, W ď Sn and assume that gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq “ 1. Then the two
following facts are equivalent:
piq every decisive, V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune to the reversal bias k-scc admits a
V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement;
piiq one of the following conditions is satisfied:
paq for every ψ PW , ψ is not a conjugate of ρ0,
pbq n ď 3,
pcq k P t1, n´ 1u,
pdq n is even and k is odd.
Proof. Apply Theorem 16 and Theorem 10.
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8 Some applications
Consider a committee having h members which is facing the problem of selecting a set of k al-
ternatives within a set of n alternatives. The committee members need a suitable procedure for
determining the k alternatives from their preferences. If they agree to express their preferences via
a linear order on the set of alternatives, they are in fact looking for a resolute k-scc. Suppose now
that there is a general agreement on the fact that the resolute k-scc to be used should obey to
certain fundamental principles which can be summarized in the requirement of being a refinement
of a given decisive, anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias k-scc C.14
In what follows we are going to discuss four particular qualifications of the above described
situation where the theory we developed can be applied and turns out to be useful to the commit-
tee. We stress that the proposed applications only focus on k-sccs. Suitable adaptations to the
framework of spcs are natural and left to the reader.
8.1 Grouping individuals and alternatives
Assume that the particular structure of the committee naturally allows to group committee members
into subcommittees and that the typology of the alternatives allows to group them into subclasses.
Suppose that committee members also agree on the fact that the desired resolute refinement of
C should not distinguish among individuals in the same subcommittee and should equally treat
alternatives in the same subclass.
Let r, s ě 1 and assume that H1, . . . , Hr Ď H is the list of subcommittees and that N1, . . . , Ns Ď
N is the list of subclasses so that tH1, . . . , Hru is a partition of H and tN1, . . . , Nsu is a partition
of N . Then, the committee needs to find a resolute refinement of C which is V -anonymous and
W -neutral, where
V “ tϕ P Sh : @j P vrw, ϕpHjq “ Hju,
W “ tψ P Sn : @j P vsw, ψpNjq “ Nju. (13)
Let us prove now that
γpV q “ gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q (14)
Indeed, consider σ P V and its type T pσq. Let x P Hj , for some j P vrw. Since σpHjq “ Hj ,
we have that xxσy Ď Hj . Thus the sets Hj are union of σ-orbits. Hence, the partition T pσq
of h induces a partition of |Hj | for all j P vrw. It follows that, for every j P vrw, gcdpT pσqq
divides |Hj | and thus gcdpT pσqq divides gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q. Then we also have that γpV q “
lcmtgcdpT pσqq : σ P V u divides gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q. If gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q “ 1, then we also have
γpV q “ 1 “ gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q. Assume then that gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q ‰ 1. Then, in particular,
|Hj | ‰ 1 for all j P vrw and it is meaningful to define a cycle σj on its elements. Consider now
σ P Sh defined by σ “ σ1 ¨ ¨ ¨σr. Then T pσq “ r|H1|, . . . , |Hr|s and gcdpT pσqq “ gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q
divides γpV q. Thus we obtain (14).
Clearly, we also have
|W | “
sź
j“1
|Nj |! (15)
Thus, by (14), (15) and Theorem 20, we deduce that if
gcd
˜
|H1|, . . . , |Hr|,
sź
j“1
|Nj |!
¸
“ 1, (16)
14Thus, C might be, for instance, the trivial, the Pareto, the Borda or the Kemeny k-scc. Recall that, those k-scc
are U -consistent for all U ď G.
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then C admits a V -anonymous and W -neutral resolute refinement. Moreover, by (14), (15) and
Theorem 21, we deduce that if (16) holds true, not all the subclasses are singletons and one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
paq there exist at least two subclasses of odd size,
pbq n ď 3,
pcq k P t1, n´ 1u,
pdq n is even and k is odd,
then C admits a V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement.
8.2 A variation on groupings of individuals and alternatives
Assume that the particular structure of the committee naturally allows to group committee members
into subcommittees and that the typology of the alternatives allows to group them into subclasses as
in Section 8.1. Suppose, this time, that committee members also agree on the fact that the desired
resolute refinement of C should not distinguish among individuals in the same subcommittee, should
not distinguish among subcommittees having the same size and should equally treat alternatives in
the same subclass.
Using the same notation used in Section 8.1, let H1, . . . , Hr be the list of subcommittees and
N1, . . . , Ns Ď N be the list of subclasses. Then, the committee needs to find a resolute refinement
of C which is V -anonymous and W -neutral, where
V “ tϕ P Sh : @j P vrw, Dk P vrw such that ϕpHjq “ Hku.
and W is as in (13). Defining now, for every j P vrw,
tj “ |tk P vrw : |Hk| “ |Hj |u|
we claim that
γpV q “ gcd p|H1|t1, . . . , |Hr|trq (17)
Indeed, consider σ P V . Note that, since σ is a bijection, for every j P vrw, we have |σpHjq| “ |Hj |
and thus σ maps an element x P Hj into an element belonging to Uj “
Ť
|Hi|“|Hj |
Hi. Thus every
Uj is a union of σ-orbits and the distinct sets Uj give a partition of H.. Hence, the partition
T pσq of h induces a partition of |Uj| “ |Hj |tj for all j P vrw. It follows that, for every j P
vrw, gcdpT pσqq | |Uj and thus gcdpT pσqq divides gcd p|U1, . . . , |Ur|q for all σ P V . Then we also
have that γpV q “ lcmtgcdpT pσqq : σ P V u divides gcd p|U1|, . . . , |Ur|q. If gcd p|U1|, . . . , |Ur|q “
1, then we also have γpV q “ 1 “ gcd p|U1|, . . . , |Ur|q and we have finished. Assume then that
gcd p|U1|, . . . , |Ur|q ‰ 1. Then, in particular, |Uj | ‰ 1 for all j P vrw and it is meaningful to
define a special cycle σj on its elements in the following way. Let Hi1 , . . . Hit be the distinct
sets of size |Hj | “ ℓ ě 1 whose union is Uj and order the elements inside each of them, say,
Hi1 “ th
1
i1
, . . . , hℓi1u, . . . , Hit “ th
1
it
, . . . , hℓitu. Define σj as the |Uj |-cycle on the elements of Uj
given by σj “ ph
1
i1
h1i2 . . . h
1
it
h2i1 h
2
i2
. . . h2it . . . h
ℓ
i1
hℓi2 . . . h
ℓ
it
q. It is immediately checked that
σjpHikq “ Hik`1 for all k P vt ´ 1w while σjpHitq “ Hi1 . Consider now σ P Sh defined by
σ “ σ1 ¨ ¨ ¨σr. Then σ P V and T pσq “ r|U1|, . . . , |Ur|s and gcdpT pσqq “ gcd p|U1|, . . . , |Ur|q divides
γpV q. Thus we obtain (17).
Thus, by (17), (15) and Theorem 20, we deduce that if
gcd
˜
|H1|t1, . . . , |Hr|tr,
sź
j“1
|Nj |!
¸
“ 1, (18)
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then C admits a V -anonymous and W -neutral resolute refinement. Moreover, by (17), (15) and
Theorem 21, we deduce that if (18) holds true, not all the subclasses are singletons and one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
paq there exist at least two subclasses of odd size,
pbq n ď 3,
pcq k P t1, n´ 1u,
pdq n is even and k is odd,
then C admits a V -anonymous, W -neutral and immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement.
8.3 Alternatives as a subset of individuals
Assume that the committee is facing the problem of electing a subcommittee of size k among
those members of the committee who are running for the selection. In this particular situation
we have that the alternatives to choose from are a subset of the set of individuals. Suppose that
committee members also agree on the fact that the desired resolute refinement of C should not
distinguish among individuals who are candidates, should not distinguish among individuals who
are not candidates and should be immune to the reversal bias.
Assume then n ď h and name 1, . . . , n the individuals running for the selection. Thus N “
t1, . . . , nu Ď H is the set of alternatives to choose from and the procedure the committee is looking
for corresponds to a U -consistent resolute refinement of C, where
U “ tpϕ, ψ, ρq P G : @i P vnw, ϕpiq “ ψpiqu. (19)
Note that if pϕ, ψ, ρq P U , then ϕpHzNq “ HzN . Note also that the above group U is not necessarily
regular. Consider, for instance, the case h “ 4 and n “ 2. Then pp1 2qp3 4q, p1 2q, idq P U violates
Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015). In the next proposition we see that, as usual, a suitable
coprimality condition is equivalent to regularity.
Proposition 22. Let n ď h. The group
U “ tpϕ, ψ, ρq P G : @i P vnw, ϕpiq “ ψpiqu
is regular if and only if gcdph, nq “ 1.
Proof. We first describe in a convenient way the elements in U. Let pϕ, ψ, ρq P U and let
ψ “
sź
i“1
γi, (20)
where the γj are disjoint cycles, constituents of ψ and s ě 0. The case s “ 0 is to be intended as
taking the product over the empty set, and by definition is equal to id. Since ψ P Sn is a permutation
of the set N Ď H and ϕ P Sh is a permutation of the set H sharing with ψ the same behaviour on
N , we have that ϕ “ ψν for some permutation ν of the set HzN . Thus there exist r ě 0 disjoint
cycles γj on the set HzN , with j P ts` 1, . . . , s` ru, such that
ϕ “
s`rź
i“1
γi (21)
and the above writing expresses ϕ as product of its constituents. Note that if r “ 0, the set
ts` 1, . . . , s` ru is empty and no cycle has to be added.
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We claim that the following property holds true:
if pϕ, ψ, ρq P U, then gcdpT pϕqq | gcdph, gcdpT pψqqq | gcdph, nq. (22)
Indeed, let pϕ, ψ, ρq P U . For ψ we have the representation (20) with s ě 0, and for ϕ the
representation (21) with r ě 0. If ψ “ id P Sn, then ϕ admits at least one fixed point. Thus
gcdpT pψqq “ 1 and gcdpT pϕqq “ 1 and (22) is obvious. If ψ ‰ id, we have s ě 1 and
gcdpT pϕqq | gcdp|γi|qq
s
i“1 “ gcdpT pψqq | n.
On the other hand gcdpT pϕqq | h, and thus (22) follows. Assume now that gcdph, nq “ 1. Then, by
(22), we have gcdpT pϕqq “ 1. In order to show that U is regular, we show that the conditions aq
and bq in Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) are satisfied. Let pϕ, ψ, idq P U , with ψ ‰ id,
and π be a prime such that |ψ|π “ π
a, for some a P N. Then obviously πa ∤ gcdpT pϕqq “ 1.
Let next pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P U , with ψ
2 “ id and ψ not a conjugate ρ0. Then clearly 2 ∤ gcdpT pϕqq “ 1.
Assume now that gcdph, nq ‰ 1. Let π be prime dividing gcdph, nq. Let ψ P Sn be a be a product
of n{π disjoint π-cycles and ϕ P Sh be a product of h{π disjoint π-cycles with the first n{π of them
equal to those forming ψ. Then pϕ, ψ, idq P U and |ψ|π “ π | gcdpT pϕqq “ π. Thus condition a) in
Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) is not satisfied. Hence U is not regular.
Thus, by Theorem 10, we deduce that if gcdph, nq “ 1 and one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
pbq n ď 3,
pcq k P t1, n´ 1u,
pdq n is even and k is odd,
then C admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.15
Note that the nature of the group U defined by (19) is very different from the groups of symmetry
considered in Sections 8.1 and 8.2. In fact, U cannot be expressed as a direct product of subgroups
in Sh and Sn. Indeed, assume by contradiction that U “ V ˆW ˆ Ω, for suitable V ď Sh and
W ď Sn. Then for every pϕ, ψ, ρq P U we also have pid, ψ, ρq P U . But picking pϕ, ψ, ρq P U , with
ψ ‰ id, we instead necessarily have ϕ ‰ id and thus pid, ψ, ρq R U.
8.4 Committee members with diverse decision power
Assume that committee members have different decision power and that their decision power is
described by an order on the set of individuals. Orders model those situations in which it is
reasonable to divide individuals into disjoint groups where all individuals have the same decision
power and to rank such groups. Consider, for instance, a faculty committee composed by full and
associate professors which is going to select some applicants for an academic position. There are
in this case two well distinguished groups in the committee and a natural hierarchy between them
ranking first the full professors and second the associate professors. Assume then that committee
members agree to use a resolute refinement of C consistent with the decision power of individuals
and which equally treat all the alternatives.
Consider then the relation R P OpHq defined as follows: for every x, y P H , we define x ľR y if
and only if individual x has a decision power which is at least as great as the one of individual y. The
15Note that condition paq in Theorem 10 cannot be satisfied because pϕ, ρ0, ρ0q P U , for any ϕ P Sh such that
ϕpiq “ ρ0piq for all i P vnw.
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procedure the committee is looking for is a resolute refinement of C which is AutpRq-anonymous
and neutral, where AutpRq is the group
AutpRq “ tσ P Sh : @x, y P H, σpxq ľR σpyq if and only if x ľR yu,
called the group of automorphisms of R.
It is well-known that the relation
IpRq “ tpx, yq P H2 : px, yq P R and py, xq P Ru
is an equivalence relation in H. Denote by H1, . . . , Hr, where r ě 1, the equivalence classes of IpRq.
We claim that
AutpRq “ tϕ P Sh : @j P vrw, ϕpHjq “ Hju. (23)
Indeed, first order the sets H1, . . . , Hr so that x P Hi and y P Hj with i ă j if and only if x ąR y.
The permutations in K “ tϕ P Sh : @j P vrw, ϕpHjq “ Hju clearly form a subgroup of Sh. We
show that K ď AutpRq. Pick ϕ P K and let x, y P H with x ľR y. If we also have y ľR x, then
x and y belong to the same Hj and thus, by K definition, ϕpxq and ϕpyq belong to Hj too. Thus
ϕpxq ľR ϕpyq. If instead y ńR x, then x ąR y. Thus we have x P Hi and y P Hj for some i, j P vrw
with i ă j. Thus, we have ϕpxq P ϕpHiq “ Hi and ϕpyq P ϕpHjq “ Hj so that, ϕpxq ąR ϕpyq and
then, in particular, ϕpxq ľR ϕpyq. Let now x, y P H with ϕpxq ľR ϕpyq. Then, the same argument
applies to ϕ´1, giving x ľR y.
We next show that AutpRq ď K. Let ϕ P AutpRq and j P vrw. We need to see that ϕpHjq “ Hj .
To that purpose, since ϕ is a bijection, it is enough to show that ϕpHjq Ď Hj . Pick x P Hj .
Since H1, . . . , Hr are a partition of H , there exists i P vrw, such that y “ ϕpxq P Hi. Assume, by
contradiction, that i ‰ j. Then, we have that x ąR y or y ąR x. Assume that x ąR y “ ϕpxq.
Since ϕ P AutpRq, applying ϕ to that relation, we get ϕpxq ąR ϕ
2pxq and thus, by transitivity
x ąR ϕ
2pxq. Iterating this argument, we then find x ąR ϕ
mpxq, for every m P N. Considering
now m such that ϕmpxq “ x, we get the contradiction x ąR x. A similar argument shows the
impossibility of y ąR x.
As a consequence, by (14), γpAutpRqq “ gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|q. Thus, by Theorem 20, we deduce
that if
gcd p|H1|, . . . , |Hr|, |N |!q “ 1, (24)
then C admits an AutpRq-anonymous, neutral and resolute refinement. Moreover, by Theorem 21,
we deduce that if (24) holds true and one of the following conditions is satisfied:
pbq n ď 3,
pcq k P t1, n´ 1u,
pdq n is even and k is odd,
then C admits an AutpRq-anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias resolute refine-
ment.16
Assume now that the conditions for the existence of AutpRq-anonymous and neutral resolute
refinements of C are satisfied. In general, such refinements of C are more than one. However, the
information we get from R goes further the mere knowledge of the indifference sets of R and we can
use this information for better selecting the resolute refinement. In order to better explain this point,
assume that the committee has a president, say individual 1, and assume that the president has a
decision power which is greater than the one of all the other members of the committee. Assume
16 Note that condition paq in Theorem 21 cannot be satisfied because obviously Sn contains permutations which
are conjugate of ρ0.
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further that all individuals but the president have the same decision power. Such a situation can
be modelled by the order R P OpHq defined by
R “ tp1, yq P H2 : y P Hu Y tpx, yq P H2 : x, y P Hzt1uu.
In this case, the indifference classes of IpRq are H1 “ t1u and H2 “ t2, . . . , hu so that (24) holds and
C admits a resolute refinement which is AutpRq-anonymous and neutral. As already emphasised
resolute refinements can be many and the problem of selecting one of them is certainly crucial.
The special characteristics of the situation under consideration can be used to make this selection.
Assume that k “ 1. Then among those resolute refinements it is natural to choose the one obtained
by letting the president break the ties by choosing his/her best alternative. This is exactly the
classic tie-breaker method widely used in practical situations. Another resolute refinement can
be obtained, for instance, by selecting the alternative which is the worst one for the president.
However, this option cannot be considered consistent with the decision power among individuals
and the role of the president. Assuming now k ě 2, there is no standard way to select a resolute
refinement. However, looking at the particular characteristics of the decision problem some resolute
refinements can be easily discarded and others can be reasonably taken into consideration.
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Appendix
A Symmetry and consistency
First of all, let us note that, for every σ P Sn, ρ P Ω, W1,W2 P PpNq, W1,W2 Ď PpNq, R1, R2 P
RpNq and Q1,Q2 Ď RpNq, we have that
σW1 Ď σW2 ôW1 ĎW2, σW1 Ď σW2 ôW1 ĎW2,
R1 Ď R2 ô σR1 Ď σR2 ô R1ρ Ď R2ρ, Q1 Ď Q2 ô σQ1 Ď σQ2 ô Q1ρ Ď Q2ρ.
(25)
From those inclusions, analogous relations for equalities hold true. We freely use those properties
in the rest of the paper. We emphasize their use when particularly remarkable.
Let U ď G. In Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Proposition 2) it is shown that the definition (6),
determines an action of U on the set of preference profiles. In particular, for every p P P and
pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q, pϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q P U , we have
p pϕ1ϕ2,ψ1ψ2,ρ1ρ2q “ pp pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2qqpϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q. (26)
The above equality is a main tool throughout the paper. To begin with it allows to prove the
basic results on symmetry and consistency stated in Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. piq Let C P P˚U and p P P . Consider first pϕ, ψ, idq P U . Since C is U -
symmetric, then Cpppϕ,ψ,idqq “ ψCppqid “ ψCppq and (8) is satisfied. In order to prove (9) assume,
by contradiction, that |Cppq| “ 1 and that there exists pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P G such that Cpp
pϕ,ψ,ρ0qq “ ψCppq.
Then Cppq “ tqu for some q P LpNq and, by the U -symmetry of C, we get ψCppqρ0 “ ψCppq. Thus,
Cppqρ0 “ Cppq, that is, qρ0 “ q, which gives the contradiction ρ0 “ id.
piiq From piq we know that P˚U Ď PU . On the other hand if C P PU we have that condition
(8) is satisfied and, since U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, that equals condition (7) so that C P P
˚U .
Proof of Proposition 2. The fact that PxU1,U2y Ď P˚U1 X P˚U2 is obvious. We show the other
inclusion. Let C P P˚U1 XP˚U2 . Consider the set
W “ tpϕ, ψ, ρq P G : @p P P , Cpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψCppqρu.
We show thatW is a subgroup ofG. Let pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q, pϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q PW and we show that pϕ1ϕ2, ψ1ψ2, ρ1ρ2q P
W. Given p P P , by (26) and recalling that Ω is abelian, we have
Cpppϕ1ϕ2,ψ1ψ2,ρ1ρ2qq “ C
´
pp pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2qqpϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q
¯
“ ψ1Cpp
pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2qqρ1 “
ψ1ψ2Cppqρ2ρ1 “ ψ1ψ2Cppqρ1ρ2.
Since W is a group and contains both U1 and U2, then we necessarily have W ě xU1, U2y. But , by
definition of W , C P P˚W and thus also C P P˚xU1,U2y.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is formally the same of Proposition 10 in Bubboloni and Gori
(2016b), simply taking into account (25). The interested reader can find the proof in Appendix
C.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let C P P˚U and p P P . Consider at first pϕ, ψ, idq P U . Since C is
U -symmetric then Cpppϕ,ψ,idqq “ ψCppq, that is, Cpppϕ,ψ,idqq “ tψq P LpNq : q P Cppqu. Then
Ckpp
pϕ,ψ,idqq “
!
tpψqqprq : 1 ď r ď ku P PkpNq : q P Cppq
)
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“
!
ψtqprq : 1 ď r ď ku P PkpNq : q P Cppq
)
“ ψ
!
tqprq : 1 ď r ď ku P PkpNq : q P Cppq
)
“ ψCkppq,
so that Ck satisfies (8). In order to show that Ck satisfies (9) too, assume by contradiction that
|Ckppq| “ 1 and that there exists pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P G such that Ckpp
pϕ,ψ,ρ0qq “ ψCkppq. Then there are k
distinct elements x1, . . . , xk of N such that Ckppq “ ttx1, . . . , xkuu and
Ckpp
pϕ,ψ,ρ0qq “ ttψpx1q, . . . , ψpxkquu. (27)
In particular, for every q P Cppq, we have tqp1q, . . . , qpkqu “ tx1, . . . , xku. By the U -symmetry of
C, we have Cpppϕ,ψ,ρ0qq “ ψCppqρ0 and thus
Ckpp
pϕ,ψ,ρ0qq “ ttq1p1q, . . . , q1pkqu P PkpNq : q
1 P ψCppqρ0u.
Now if q1 P ψCppqρ0 there exists q P Cppq such that q
1 “ ψqρ0 and therefore q
1p1q “ ψqρ0p1q “
ψqpnq. Since n ą k and q is a bijection we have that qpnq R tqp1q, . . . , qpkqu “ tx1, . . . , xku. Thus,
since also ψ is a bijection, we also have q1p1q “ ψqpnq R tψpx1q, . . . , ψpxkqu. It follows that no
element of Ckpp
pϕ,ψ,ρ0qq can coincide with tψpx1q, . . . , ψpxkqu, against (27).
Proof of Proposition 5. We show that, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U , CRpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψCRppqρ.
Fix p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U and prove first that ψCRppqρ Ď CRpppϕ,ψ,ρqq. Pick q P CRppq and show
that ψqρ P CRpppϕ,ψ,ρqq. We have q Ě Rppq, which implies ψqρ Ě ψRppqρ. Since R is U -symmetric,
we then have ψqρ Ě Rpppϕ,ψ,ρqq and therefore ψqρ P CRpppϕ,ψ,ρqq.
Let us prove now the other inclusion CRpppϕ,ψ,ρqq Ď ψCRppqρ. Let p “ ppϕ,ψ,ρq and note that
p “ ppϕ
´1,ψ´1,ρq. Observe that, since U is a group and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U also its inverse pϕ, ψ, ρq´1 “
pϕ´1, ψ´1, ρq P U. Thus, by the inclusion just proved, we get ψ´1CRppqρ Ď CRpppϕ
´1,ψ´1,ρqq, that
is, ψ´1CRpppϕ,ψ,ρqqρ Ď CRppq and we conclude applying ψ on the left and ρ on the right to both
sides of that inclusion.
Proof of Proposition 6. Repeat word by word the proof of Proposition 2 writing M instead of P
and R instead of C.
B Proof of Theorems 7, 9 and 10
The proofs of Theorems 7, 9 and 10 are definitely technical and require some preliminary work.
We underline that the results we are going to prove are more general as they provide a method to
potentially build and count all the resolute refinements.
B.1 The role of the orbit representatives
Let U ď G and p P P . The set pU “ tpg P P : g P Uu is called the U -orbit of p and StabU ppq “
tg P U : pg “ pu ď U is called the stabilizer of p in U . Recall that, for every g P U , we
have StabU pp
gq “ StabU ppq
g. The set PU “ tpU : p P Pu of the U -orbits is a partition of
P . We use PU as set of indexes and denote its elements with j. A vector ppjqjPPU P ˆjPPUP
is called a system of representatives of the U -orbits if, for every j P PU , pj P j. The set of
the systems of representatives of the U -orbits is denoted by SpUq. If ppjqjPPU P SpUq, then,
for every p P P , there exist j P PU and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρq. Note that if
pj1 pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q “ pj2 pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2q for some j1, j2 P P
U and some pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q, pϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q P U , then j1 “ j2
and, by (26), pϕ´1
2
ϕ1, ψ
´1
2
ψ1, ρ
´1
2
ρ1q P StabU pp
j1q.
In this section we present some results explaining how a correspondence C P P˚U YPU Y CUk
is determined by the values it assumes on a system of representatives of the U -orbits in P . To that
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purpose, the first step is to split PU into two parts PU1 and P
U
2 , where
PU
1
“
 
j P PU : @p P j, StabU ppq ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu
(
,
P
U
2 “
 
j P PU : @p P j, StabU ppq ­ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu
(
.
Note that those sets are well defined because U X pSh ˆ Sn ˆ tiduq is normal in U . Moreover
PU
1
Y PU
2
“ PU and PU
1
X PU
2
“ ∅. In particular, PU
1
and PU
2
cannot be both empty. Obviously,
if U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, then P
U
2 “ ∅ and P
U “ PU1 ‰ ∅. We recall a part of Proposition 24 in
Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) which is interesting for our scope17:
PU2 ‰ ∅ if and only if there exists pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P U such that ψ is a conjugate of ρ0. (28)
Proposition 23. Let U ď G and C,C 1 P P˚U . Assume that there exists ppjqjPPU P SpUq such
that, for every j P PU , Cppjq “ C 1ppjq. Then C “ C 1.
Proof. Let p P P and show that Cppq “ C 1ppq. We know there exist j P PU and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such
that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρq. Then, Cppq “ Cppj pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψCppjqρ “ ψC 1ppjqρ “ C 1ppj pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ C 1ppq.
Proposition 24. Let U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu and C,C
1 P PU (C,C 1 P CUk ). Assume that there exists
ppjqjPPU P SpUq such that Cpp
jq “ C 1ppjq for all j P PU . Then C “ C 1.
The proof of the above result is the same as the one of Proposition 12 in Bubboloni and Gori
(2016b). The interested reader can be find that proof in Appendix C.
Proposition 25. Let U ď G such that U ­ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, C,C
1 P PU (C,C 1 P CUk ). Assume
that there exist ppjqjPPU P SpUq and pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q P U such that Cpp
jq “ C 1ppjq for all j P PU and
Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ C 1ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq for all j P PU
1
. Then C “ C 1.
The proof of the above result is formally the same as the one of Proposition 13 in Bubboloni
and Gori (2016b). The interested reader can be find that proof in Appendix C.
B.2 Resolute spcs and k-sccs
We have defined C P P (C P Ck) resolute if, for every p P P , |Cppq| “ 1. We now denote by F (Fk)
the set of resolute spc (k-scc). Obviously, we have F Ď P and Fk Ď Ck and, for every U ď G, we
can consider the following sets
F˚U “ FXP˚U , FU “ FXPU , FUk “ Fk X C
U
k .
They describe, respectively, the set of the U -symmetric resolute spc, the set of the U -consistent
resolute spc, the set of the U -consistent resolute k-scc.
Given C P F, for every p P P , there exists a unique q P LpNq such that Cppq “ tqu. Thus C
can be naturally identified with the social preference function (spf) f from P to LpNq defined, for
every p P P , by fppq “ q. Similarly, given C P Fk, for every p P P , there exists a unique W P PkpNq
such that Cppq “ tW u. Thus C can be naturally identified with the k-multiwinner social choice
function (k-scf) f from P to PkpNq defined, for every p P P , by fppq “ W. We will freely adopt
those identifications and the language of functions in what follows. For that reason we will refer to
F˚U also as the set of the U -symmetric spfs; to FU also as the set of the U -consistent spfs; to FUk
also as the set of the U -consistent k-scfs.
Let C P P (C P Ck). Denote the refinements of C by PC (Ck,C). Then the resolute refinements
of C are the functions in the set FC “ FXPC (Fk,C “ Fk X Ck,C).
17Further details can be found in Section 5.2 of Bubboloni and Gori (2016b).
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Let now U ď G. Given C P P, we consider the following sets
F˚UC “ F
˚U X FC , F
U
C “ F
U X FC .
They describe, respectively, the set of the U -symmetric spfs which are refinements of C and the
set of the U -consistent spfs which are refinements of C. Given C P Ck, we finally consider the set
FUk,C “ F
U
k X Fk,C
describing the set of U -consistent k-scfs which are refinements of C.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 7
In order to approach the proof of Theorem 7 we need some preliminary facts. Let U ď G and S P P
be defined, for every p P P , by
Sppq “
 
q P LpNq : @pϕ, ψ, ρq P StabU ppq, ψqρ “ q
(
.18
Proposition 26. Let U ď G. Then the following facts hold:
piq S is decisive if and only if U is regular.
piiq S P P˚U .
piiiq If f P F˚U , then f P FS.
Proof. piq Let U be regular. Proving (11), in Bubboloni and Gori (2015), the authors showed that
Sppq “
#
LpNq if StabU ppq ď Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu
uCSnpρ0q if StabU ppq ę Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu,
where CSnpρ0q denotes the centralizer of ρ0 in Sn and u P Sn is such that ψ˚ “ uρ0u
´1, with
ψ˚ P Sn the permutation appearing in the definition (10) of regularity. In particular,
|Sppq| “
#
n! if StabU ppq ď Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu
2t
n
2
utn
2
u! if StabU ppq ę Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu.
(29)
Thus the fact that S is decisive immediately follows from (29).
Assume now that S is decisive. We need to show that, for every p P P , pϕ, ψ, idq P StabU ppq
implies ψ “ id, and pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabU ppq implies ψ “ ψ˚ for a suitable unique conjugate ψ˚ of
ρ0. Let p P P and pick q0 P Sppq. If pϕ, ψ, idq P StabU ppq, then we have ψq0 “ q0 and thus, by
cancellation, ψ “ id. If pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabU ppq, then we have ψq0ρ0 “ q0, which implies ψ “ q0ρ0q
´1
0
(recall that the linear order q0 is identified with an element of Sn). Thus, ψ˚ “ q0ρ0q
´1
0
works.
piiq In order to show that S is U -symmetric, we pick pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q P U and see that Spp
pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1qq “
ψ1Sppqρ1. Recall that StabU pp
pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1qq “ StabU ppq
pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q. Thus, q P Spppϕ1,ψ1,ρ1qq if and only if,
for every pϕ, ψ, ρq P StabU ppq, ψ1ψψ
´1
1
qρ1ρρ
´1
1
“ q, which is equivalent to ψpψ´1
1
qρ1qρ “ ψ
´1
1
qρ1,
that is, to ψ´1
1
qρ1 P Sppq and thus to q P ψ1Sppqρ1.
piiiq This is just Lemma 4 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015).
By the above proposition, any U -symmetric spf maps the profile p into an element of Sppq.
The next result shows that, conversely, one can construct f P F˚U just fixing a system ppjqjPPU of
representatives and assigning within Sppjq the value to be assumed on each pj. Its proof is formally
equal to Proposition 5 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) and can be find in Appendix C.
18The spc S was first considered in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Section 4.1) and there denoted by SU
1
.
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Proposition 27. Let U ď G be regular and ppjqjPPU P SpUq. For every j P P
U , let qj P Spp
jq.
Then there exists a unique f P F˚U such that, for every j P PU , fppjq “ qj.
Given now ppjqjPPU P SpUq, let
Φ : ˆjPPUSpp
jq Ñ F˚U
be the function which associates with every pqjqjPPU P ˆjPPUSpp
jq the unique f P F˚U defined in
Proposition 27. Of course, Φ depends on ppjqjPPU but we do not emphasize that dependence in the
notation. Note that Φ is injective.
Theorem 28. Let U ď G be regular, ppjqjPPU P SpUq and C P P
˚U . Then
F˚UC “ Φ
`
ˆjPPUSpp
jq X Cppjq
˘
and
|F˚UC | “
ź
jPPU
|Sppjq X Cppjq|.
Proof. We first prove that Φ
`
ˆjPPUSpp
jq X Cppjq
˘
Ď F˚UC . Let pqjqjPPU P ˆjPPUSpp
jq X Cppjq
and f “ Φ
`
pqjqjPPU
˘
. We show that f P F˚UC . We know that f P F
˚U , so that have are left with
showing that f P FC . Given p P P , there exist j P P
U and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρq. As
we know that qj “ fpp
jq P Cppjq, by U -symmetry of f and C, we have
fppq “ fppj pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψqjρ P ψCpp
jqρ “ Cppj pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ Cppq
as desired.
Let us next prove that F˚UC Ď Φ
`
ˆjPPUSpp
jq X Cppjq
˘
. Consider then f P F˚UC and note that, by
Proposition 26(iii), for every j P PU , fppjq P SppjqXCppjq. Then pfppjqqjPPU P ˆjPPUSpp
jqXCppjq.
Thus the function f and the function Φ
`
pfppjqqjPPU
˘
are U -symmetric functions which coincide
on a system of representatives. Hence, by Proposition 23, we obtain f “ Φ
`
pfppjqqjPPU
˘
.
The last part of the statement is an immediate consequence of the fact that Φ is injective.
In order to write down the proof of Theorem 7 we need a final technical lemma.
Lemma 29. Let R P M˚U and p P P. Then, for every x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabU ppq,
px, yq P Rppq if and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P Rppq.
Proof. Let x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabU ppq. Then, by the U -symmetry of R, we have Rppq “
Rpppϕ,ψ,ρ0q “ ψRppqρ0. On the other hand, x ľRppq y is equivalent to ψpyq ľψRppqρ0 ψpxq and thus
to ψpyq ľRppq ψpxq.
Proof of Theorem 7. piq ñ piiq. The fact that C P P˚U admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement
means that F˚UC ‰ ∅. Let then f P F
˚U
C and define the social method R : P Ñ RpNq, by
Rppq “ fppqz∆ for all p P P , where ∆ “ tpx, xq : x P Nu. Note that ∆ is a relation on N and that
for every ψ P Sn and ρ P Ω, we have ψ∆ρ “ ∆, accordingly to the definitions given in Section 2.2.
We show that R is irreflexive, acyclic, U -symmetric and that CR refines C.
Let p P P . Rppq is irreflexive by definition and surely acyclic since it refines the linear order
fppq. Let pϕ, ψ, ρq P U . Then, by the U -symmetry of f , we have
Rpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ fpppϕ,ψ,ρqqz∆ “ pψfppqρqzpψ∆ρq “ ψpfppqz∆qρ “ ψRppqρ.
Thus R P M˚U . Finally, observe that
CRppq “ tq P LpNq : Rppq Ď qu “ tq P LpNq : fppqz∆ Ď qu “ tfppqu Ď Cppq.
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Thus CR refines C.
piiq ñ piiiq Let R be an irreflexive, acyclic, U -symmetric social method such that CR refines C.
Then, by Lemma 29, condition paq in (iii) is fulfilled.
piiiq ñ piq The proof is a remake of Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Section 8), which is essentially
obtained replacing the minimal majority relation Rνppqppq there, with the present relation Rppq.
The interested reader can find the proof in Appendix C.
B.4 Analysis of FUC and F
U
k,C when U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu
Proposition 30. Let U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu be regular, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq and C P P
U pC P CUk q. For
every j P PU , let xj P Cpp
jq. Then there exists a unique f P FUC (f P F
U
k,C) such that, for every
j P PU , fppjq “ xj .
The proof of the above result is similar to the one of Proposition 17 in Bubboloni and Gori
(2016b) and can be find in Appendix C.
Let U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu be regular, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq and C P P
U (C P CUk ). Consider the
function
Φ : ˆjPPUCpp
jq Ñ FUC ,
`
Φ : ˆjPPUCpp
jq Ñ FUk,C
˘
which associates with every pxjqjPPU P ˆjPPUCpp
jq the unique f P FUC (f P F
U
k,C) defined in Propo-
sition 30. Of course, Φ depends on U , ppjqjPPU and C but we do not emphasize that dependence in
the notation. Note that we used the same letter Φ to treat both spfs and k-scfs. Note also that
Φ is injective.
Theorem 31. Let U ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu be regular, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq and C P P
U pC P CUk q. Then
FUC “ Φ
`
ˆjPPUCpp
jq
˘ ´
FUk,C “ Φ
`
ˆjPPUCpp
jq
˘ ¯
and
|FUC | “
ź
jPPU
ˇˇ
Cppjq
ˇˇ ´
|FUk,C | “
ź
jPPU
ˇˇ
Cppjq
ˇˇ ¯
.
In particular, if C is decisive, then FUC ‰ ∅ pF
U
k,C ‰ ∅q.
The proof of the above result is similar to the one of Theorem 18 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b)
and can be found in Appendix C.
B.5 Analysis of FUC and F
U
k,C when U ę Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu
Let U ď G be regular such that U ę Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, C P P
U pC P CUk q. Recall that if p P P and
y P Cppq, then y P LpNq (y P PkpNq). Moreover, given ψ P Sn, the meaning of the writing ψy is
carefully explained in Section 2.2.
Fix ppjqjPPU P SpUq and pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q P U . Define, for every j P P
U
1 , the set
A1Cpp
jq “ tpy, zq P Cppjq ˆ Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq : z ‰ ψ˚yu,
and, for every j P PU
2
, the set
A2Cpp
jq “
 
x P Cppjq : ψjx ‰ x
(
,
where ψj is the unique element in Sn such that
StabU pp
jq Ď pSh ˆ tidu ˆ tiduq Y pSh ˆ tψju ˆ tρ0uq. (30)
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Note that the uniqueness of ψj is guaranteed by Lemma 16 (ii) in Bubboloni and Gori (2016).
Next if PU
1
‰ ∅, then define
A1C “ ˆjPPU
1
A1Cpp
jq,
and if PU
2
‰ ∅, then define
A2C “ ˆjPPU
2
A2Cpp
jq.
Recall that PU1 and P
U
2 cannot be both empty. Thus at least one of the above set is always defined.
Of course, A1C and A
2
C depend also on U , pp
jqjPPU and pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q but we do not emphasize that
dependence in the notation.
The proof of the next result is similar to Proposition 19 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) and can
be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 32. Let U ď G be regular such that U ­ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq,
pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q P U and C P P
U (C P CUk ). For every j P P
U
1
, let pyj , zjq P A
1
Cpp
jq and, for ev-
ery j P PU
2
, let xj P A
2
Cpp
jq. Then there exists a unique f P FUC (f P F
U
k,C) such that fpp
jq “ yj
and fppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ zj for all j P P
U
1
, and fppjq “ xj for all j P P
U
2
.
Let U ď G be regular such that U ­ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq, pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q P U and
C P PU (C P CUk ).
- If PU
2
“ ∅, then let Ψ1 : A
1
C Ñ F
U
C (Ψ1 : A
1
C Ñ F
U
k,C) be the function which associates with
every pyj , zjqjPPU
1
P A1C , the unique f P F
U
C (f P F
U
k,C) defined in Proposition 32.
- If PU
1
“ ∅, then let Ψ2 : A
2
C Ñ F
U
C (Ψ2 : A
2
C Ñ F
U
k,C) be the function which associates with
every pxjqjPPU
2
P A2C , the unique f P F
U
C (f P F
U
k,C) defined in Proposition 32.
- If PU1 ‰ ∅ and P
U
2 ‰ ∅, then let Ψ3 : A
1
CˆA
2
C Ñ F
U
C (Ψ3 : A
1
CˆA
2
C Ñ F
U
k,C) be the function
which associates with every ppyj , zjqjPPU
1
, pxjqjPPU
2
q P A1C ˆA
2
C , the unique f P F
U
C (f P F
U
k,C)
defined in Proposition 32.
Of course, Ψ1, Ψ2 and Ψ3 depend on U , pp
jqjPPU , pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q and C but we do not emphasize that
dependence in the notation. Note also that Ψ1, Ψ2 and Ψ3 are injective.
Theorem 33. Let U ď G be regular such that U ­ď ShˆSnˆtidu, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq, pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q P U
and C P PU pC P CUk q. Then
FUC
`
FUk,C
˘
“
$&
%
Ψ1pA
1
Cq if P
U
2
“ ∅
Ψ2pA
2
Cq if P
U
1
“ ∅
Ψ3pA
1
C ˆA
2
Cq if P
U
1
‰ ∅ and PU
2
‰ ∅
and
|FUC |
`
|FUk,C |
˘
“
$&
%
|A1C | if P
U
2
“ ∅
|A2C | if P
U
1 “ ∅
|A1C | ¨ |A
2
C | if P
U
1
‰ ∅ and PU
2
‰ ∅
Moreover, if C is decisive, then we have that:
• for every j P PU
1
, A1Cpp
jq ‰ ∅,
• FUC ‰ ∅ pF
U
k,C ‰ ∅q if and only if, for every j P P
U
2 , A
2
Cpp
jq ‰ ∅.
Proof. Let C P PU . Assume first that PU1 and P
U
2 are both nonempty. Consider f P F
U
C and note
that ´
pfppjq, fppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qqqjPPU
1
, pfppjqqjPPU
2
¯
P A1C ˆA
2
C ,
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and
Ψ3
´
pfppjq, fppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qqqjPPU
1
, pfppjqqjPPU
2
¯
“ f.
Thus Ψ3 is bijective and we have |F
U
C | “ |A
1
C ˆ A
2
C | “ |A
1
C | ¨ |A
2
C |. The case P
U
1
“ ∅ and the case
PU
2
“ ∅ are similar and then omitted.
Assume now that C is decisive. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists j P PU1 such that
A1Cpp
jq “ ∅. Thus, for every y P Cppjq and z P Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq we have z “ ψ˚y. Using decisiveness,
fix z P Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq. If y1, y2 P Cpp
jq, we then have z “ ψ˚y1 “ ψ˚y2 so that y1 “ y2. It follows
that |Cppjq| “ 1 “ |Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq| and that Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ ψ˚Cpp
jq, against U -consistency.
The last part of the theorem is trivial.
Let now consider C P CUk . The theorem can be proved using formally the same argument.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9. Let first U ď ShˆSnˆtidu. Then, by Theorem 31, we have that F
U
C ‰ ∅. Let
next U ę Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu. In order to show that also in this case we have F
U
C ‰ ∅, by Theorem 33,
we need to prove that, for every j P PU2 , A
2
Cpp
jq ‰ ∅. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists
j P PU
2
such that A2Cpp
jq “ ∅ and consider ψj P Sn as defined in (30). Then, for every x P Cpp
jq,
we have ψjx “ x. Recall that ψj is a conjugate of ρ0 and thus, in particular, ψj ‰ id. Since C is
decisive, we can pick x P Cppjq. Thus x P Sn and, using the cancellation law in Sn, we get the
contradiction ψj “ id.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 33, says that to guarantee the existence of a U -consistent resolute refinement for some
C P CUk YP
U we need to satisfy the condition A2Cpp
jq ‰ ∅ for every j P PU
2
, where ppjqjPPU P SpUq.
We have seen in the proof of Theorem 9, that that condition always holds if C P PU . On the other
hand, there is no reason for having it satisfied when C P CUk . Indeed, in that context, A
2
Cpp
jq “ ∅
for some j P PU
2
means that for ψj P Sn defined by (30) we have
for every x P Cppjq, ψjx “ x. (31)
In other words, ψj fixes all the k-subsets of N appearing in Cpp
jq. Thus the elements of Cppjq need
to be union of ψj-orbits and this does not constitute, in principle, a contradictory fact.
The situation is then more variegated with respect to the case of the spcs and, in order to
manage it, we need some preliminary work. The next lemma is an easy but very useful starting
point.
Lemma 34. Let U ď G be regular such that U ­ď Sh ˆ Sn ˆ tidu, pp
jqjPPU P SpUq and C P C
U
k . If
j P PU2 is such that |Cpp
jq| “ 1, then A2Cpp
jq ‰ ∅.
Proof. Let Cppjq “ tx1u where x1 is a k-subset ofN and assume, by contradiction, that A
2
Cpp
jq “ ∅.
Thus, by (31), we have ψjx1 “ x1, with ψj P Sn defined in (30). Since j P P
U
2
, there exists
pϕ1, ψ1, ρ0q P StabU pp
jq and, by the regularity of U , we have ψ1 “ ψj . Thus ψ1x1 “ x1. It follows
that ψ´1
1
Cppjq “ Cppjq. On the other hand, since U ­ď ShˆSnˆtidu, there exists pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ0q P U
and, by (26) and (8), we deduce that
Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ C
´
ppj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0qqpϕ˚ϕ
´1
1
,ψ˚ψ
´1
1
,idq
¯
“ Cppj pϕ˚ϕ
´1
1
,ψ˚ψ
´1
1
,idqq “ ψ˚ψ
´1
1
Cppjq “ ψ˚Cpp
jq,
which contradicts (9).
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Proof of the implication piiq ñ piq of Theorem 10. Assume that one among paq-pdq holds and let
C P CUk be decisive. We will prove that F
U
k,C ‰ ∅.
If paq holds then, by (28), we have PU
2
“ ∅. Hence, by Theorem 33, we immediately deduce
FUk,C ‰ ∅. Assume then that paq does not hold but one among pbq-pdq holds. Then, using the other
implication in (28), we have PU
2
‰ ∅ and, by Theorem 33, we need to show that, for every j P PU
2
,
A2Cpp
jq ‰ ∅.
Assume by contradiction that for some j P PU
2
, we have A2Cpp
jq “ ∅. Thus (31) holds true, for
ψj P Sn defined by(30). Recall now that ψj is a conjugate of ρ0. Thus if n is even all its orbits
have size 2; if n is odd we have a unique orbit of size 1 given by the only fixed point of ψj and all
the other orbits have size 2.
Assume first that k “ 1. Then, for every x P Cppjq, x is a singleton and the unique element
in x is a fixed point for ψj . Since, for n even, ψj has no fixed point we deduce that n is odd and
Cppjq “ ttx1uu where x1 is the only fixed point of ψj . Thus, by Lemma 34, we get the contradiction
A2Cpp
jq ‰ ∅.
Assume now that n ď 3. Because of the previous step we need to consider only the case n “ 3
and k “ 2. Thus, every x P Cppjq is a 2-subset of N fixed by ψj . But Tψj “ r1, 2s, that is, ψj “ pa bq
for some distinct a, b P N . Thus the only possibility is x “ ta, bu and hence Cppjq “ tta, buu is a
singleton. Again Lemma 34 gives the internal contradiction A2Cpp
jq ‰ ∅.
Assume next that n is even and k is odd. Every x P Cppjq is a k-subset of N fixed by ψj . But
since every orbit of ψj has size 2, any subset of N fixed by ψj has even size. Thus Cpp
jq “ ∅
against decisiveness.
Finally assume that k “ n ´ 1. If n is even, then k is odd and we conclude by the previous
step. If n is odd, we have that every x P Cppjq is a pn´ 1q-subset of N fixed by ψj . But the unique
subset of N of size n ´ 1 fixed by ψj is the union of the orbits of ψj of size 2, that is Nztx1u,
where x1 is the unique fixed point of ψj . Thus, |Cpp
jq| “ 1 and Lemma 34 gives the contradiction
A2Cpp
jq ‰ ∅.
We are now left with proving the implication piq ñ piiq of Theorem 10. To that purpose, we
need to introduce and study a special family of k-sccs.
Let U ď G be regular. For every p P P , denote by ψp the unique permutation in Sn such that
StabU ppq Ď pSh ˆ tidu ˆ tiduq Y pSh ˆ tψpu ˆ tρ0uq .
The k-scc Uk associated with U is defined, for every p P P , by
Ukppq “
$&
%
PkpNq if StabU ppq ď Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu
tx P PkpNq : ψp x “ xu if StabU ppq ę Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu
The next two propositions show some important properties of Uk.
Proposition 35. Let U ď G be regular. The following facts are equivalent:
piq Uk is decisive.
piiq One of the following condition is satisfied:
paq PU
2
“ ∅;
pbq n is odd;
pcq n is even with n ě 4 and k is even.
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Proof. piq ñ piiq Let Uk be decisive, P
U
2 ‰ ∅ and n even. We show that n ě 4 and that k is even.
Since PU
2
‰ ∅, there exists p P P such that StabU ppq ę Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu and thus there exists
pϕ, ψp, ρ0q P StabU ppq. By Ukppq ‰ ∅, we deduce that there exists at least one k-subset x of N fixed
by ψp. Since 1 ď k ď n´ 1, x is a proper nonempty subset of N which is union of ψp-orbits. Since
n is even, we have n{2 orbits all of size 2. If n “ 2, then we have just one orbit and thus the only
subsets of N which are union of orbits are ∅ and N . It follows that n ě 4 and that k “ |x| is even.
piiq ñ piq Let Q “ tp P P : StabU ppq ę Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tiduu. Since PkpNq ‰ ∅, in order to show
that Uk is decisive, it is enough to see that for every p P Q, we have tx P PkpNq : ψp x “ xu ‰ ∅.
If PU2 “ ∅, this is clear because necessarily we also have Q “ ∅. Let n be odd and pick p P Q.
Then ψp has
n´1
2
ě 1 orbits of size 2 and one orbit of size 1. Assembling some of those orbits we
can surely build a k-subset of N fixed by ψp, whatever k is. Thus tx P PkpNq : ψp x “ xu ‰ ∅. Let
finally n be even with n ě 4 and k be even. Then we have 2 ď k ď n´ 2. Pick p P Q. Then ψp has
n
2
ě 2 orbits of size 2. Assembling some of those orbits we can surely build a k-subset of N fixed
by ψp. Thus, tx P PkpNq : ψp x “ xu ‰ ∅.
In order to state the next result, let us first define the set
T “ tpn, kq P N2 : n ď 3u Y tpn, kq P N2 : k P t1, n´ 1uu Y tpn, kq P N2 : n is even, k is oddu. (32)
Proposition 36. Let U ď G be regular. Then the following facts hold:
piq If pϕ, ψ, ρq P U and p P P, then Ukpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψUkppq.
piiq If pn, kq R T then, for every p P P, |Ukppq| ě 2. In particular Uk is decisive.
piiiq If pn, kq R T then Uk P C
U
k .
Proof. piq Let first p be such that StabU ppq ď Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu. Then also StabU pp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq ď
Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu and thus Ukpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ Ukppq “ PkpNq “ ψPkpNq “ ψUkppq.
Let next p be such that StabU ppq ę Shˆtiduˆtidu. Then also StabU pp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq ę Shˆtiduˆtidu.
We find the link between ψp and ψppϕ,ψ,ρq . Let pϕ1, ψp, ρ0q P StabU ppq. Then, using the fact that Ω
is abelian, we have
pϕ1, ψp, ρ0q
pϕ,ψ,ρq “ pϕϕ
1
, ψψp , ρ
ρ
0
q “ pϕϕ
1
, ψψp , ρ0q P StabU ppq
pϕ,ψ,ρq “ StabU pp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq.
Thus, ψppϕ,ψ,ρq “ pψpq
ψ . Using PkpNq “ ψPkpNq and (25), it follows that
Ukpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ tx P PkpNq : ψppϕ,ψ,ρq x “ xu “ tψx P PkpNq : x P PkpNq, ψψpψ
´1ψ x “ ψxu “
tψx P PkpNq : x P PkpNq, ψp x “ xu “ ψUkppq.
piiq Let pn, kq R T . Then we have k R t1, n ´ 1u and n ě 4. Moreover, n is odd or n is even
and k is even. Thus, by Lemma 35, Uk is decisive. Fix now p P P . We show that |Ukppq| ě 2.
If Ukppq “ PkpNq, we have |Ukppq| “
`
n
k
˘
ě n ě 2. If instead Ukppq “ tx P PkpNq : ψp x “ xu,
then Ukppq is made up by all the k-subsets of N which can be formed as union of ψp-orbits. Since
|Ukppq| ě 1 we have at least one of them, say x1 P Ukppq. Let first n be odd. Then n ě 5 and
there are n´1
2
ě 2 orbits of ψp of size 2 and one orbit of size 1. Since k ě 2, there is at least one
orbit of size 2 included in x1. On the other hand, not all the orbits of size 2 are included in x1,
otherwise k “ |x1| “ n´ 1. Now exchange one orbit of size 2 included in x1 with one orbit of size
2 left out. This builds another k-subset x2 of N belonging to Ukppq. Let next n be even and k be
even. Here n ě 4 and we have n
2
ě 2 orbits of ψp all of size 2. Obviously we have used at least
one orbit to build x1 but not all and we can exchange one orbit included in x1 with one left out
building another k-subset x2 of N belonging to Ukppq.
piiiq By piq we have that condition (8) for U -consistency is satisfied; by piiq we also have that,
trivially, condition (9) for U -consistency is satisfied because it is never the case to have Ukppq a
singleton for any p P P . Thus Uk P C
U
k .
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Proof of the implication piq ñ piiq of Theorem 10. By (28), we get the desired result proving that
if PU
2
‰ ∅ and pn, kq R T , then FUk,Uk “ ∅. Indeed, assume that P
U
2
‰ ∅ and pn, kq R T and
consider Uk. By Proposition 36, we have that Uk P C
U
k . Consider pp
jqjPPU P SpUq and pick j P P
U
2
so that StabU pp
jq ę Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu. Then, by definition of Uk, we have
Ukpp
jq “ tx P PkpNq : ψpj x “ xu “ tx P PkpNq : ψj x “ xu.
Therefore we surely have that, for every x P Ukppq, ψj x “ x and (31) is satisfied, so that A
2
Uk
ppjq “
∅ and, by Theorem 33, FUk,Uk “ ∅.
C Additional material for reader’s convenience
We collect here the detailed proofs of those results which are an adaptations of results recently
published by the two authors.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us prove first that PU1 X PU2 “ PxU1,U2y. Since xU1, U2y ď G contains both U1 and U2, we
immediately get PxU1,U2y Ď PU1 X PU2 . Let us now fix C P PU1 X PU2 and prove C P PxU1,U2y.
Define, for every t P N, the set xU1, U2yt of the elements in xU1, U2y that can be written as product
of t elements of U1 Y U2. Then we have xU1, U2y “
Ť
tPNxU1, U2yt and to get C P P
xU1,U2y it is
enough to show the two following facts:
paq for every t P N,
for every p P P and g “ pϕ, ψ, idq P xU1, U2yt, (8) holds true; (33)
pbq for every t P N, p P P and g “ pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P xU1, U2yt, (9) holds true.
For every g “ pϕ, ψ, ρq P G, define g “ pϕ, ψ, idq P G. We start showing that, for every t P N,
g P xU1, U2yt implies g P xU1, U2yt. (34)
If ρ “ id, there is nothing to prove. So assume ρ “ ρ0. Since, for every i P t1, 2u, we have that
Ui “ Zi ˆ Ri with Zi ď Sh ˆ Sh and Ri ď Ω, then (34) surely holds for t “ 1. If t ě 2, pick
g “ g1 ¨ ¨ ¨ gt “ pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P xU1, U2yt, where g1, . . . , gt P U1 Y U2. Since ρ0 has order two, the
number of j P t1, . . . , tu such that the third component of gj is ρ0 is odd. Pick j P t1, . . . , tu
such that gj “ pϕj , ψj , ρ0q. By the case t “ 1, we have that gj “ pϕj , ψj , idq P U1 Y U2, so
that g “ g1 . . . gj´1gjgj`1 . . . gt P xU1, U2yt and its first and second components are equal to those
of g. Moreover, the number of factors in g having as third component ρ0 is even, which gives
g “ pϕ, ψ, idq.
We now show paq, by induction on t. If t “ 1, we have g P xU1, U2y1 “ U1 Y U2 and so (33)
is guaranteed by C P PU1 X PU2 . Assume (33) up to some t P N and show that it holds also for
t ` 1. Let p P P and g “ pϕ, ψ, idq P xU1, U2yt`1. Then there exist g˚ “ pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ˚q P xU1, U2yt
and g1 “ pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q P U1 Y U2 such that g “ g1g˚ “ pϕ1ϕ˚, ψ1ψ˚, ρ1ρ˚q. We want to show that
Cppgq “ ψ1ψ˚Cppq. Note that g “ g1g˚ and that, by (34), g˚ P xU1, U2yt and g1 P U1 Y U2.
Then, using (26) and applying the inductive hypothesis for (33) both to g
1
and to g˚, we get
Cppgq “ Cppg1g˚q “ Cpppg˚qg1q “ ψ1Cpp
g˚q “ ψ1ψ˚Cppq.
We next show pbq. Let t P N, p P P , g “ pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P xU1, U2yt and |Cppq| “ 1. We need to
show that Cppgq ‰ ψCppq. First of all note that, since xU1, U2y contains an element with third
component ρ0, then we necessarily have R1 “ Ω or R2 “ Ω, so that pid, id, ρ0q P U1YU2. Moreover,
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we can express g as g “ g pid, id, ρ0q and, by (34), g P xU1, U2yt. Thus, by (26) and paq, we have
Cppgq “ Cppppid,id,ρ0qqgq “ ψCpppid,id,ρ0qq. On the other hand, since pid, id, ρ0q P U1 Y U2 and
C P PU1 XPU2 , we get Cpppid,id,ρ0qq ‰ Cppq and so, by (25), Cppgq “ ψCpppid,id,ρ0qq ‰ ψCppq as
required.
The proof of the equality CU1k X C
U2
k “ C
xU1,U2y
k is formally the same.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 24
Let p P P and show that Cppq “ C 1ppq. We know there exist j P PU and pϕ, ψ, idq P U such that
p “ pj pϕ,ψ,idq. Then,
Cppq “ Cppj pϕ,ψ,idqq “ ψCppjq “ ψC 1ppjq “ C 1ppj pϕ,ψ,idqq “ C 1ppq. (35)
C.3 Proof of Proposition 25
Let p P P and show that Cppq “ C 1ppq. Let j P PU be the unique orbit such that p P j. If there
exists pϕ, ψ, idq P U such that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,idq, then we get Cppq “ C 1ppq operating as in (35). So,
assume that,
for every pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρq, we have ρ “ ρ0. (36)
We show that (36) implies StabU pp
jq ď ShˆSnˆtidu. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that there
exists pϕ1, ψ1, ρ0q P StabU pp
jq. Pick pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P U such that p “ p
j pϕ,ψ,ρ0q and note that, by (26),
p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρ0q “ ppj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0qqpϕ,ψ,ρ0q “ pj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,idq
which contradicts (36). As a consequence, j P PU
1
and thus, by assumption, Cppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “
C 1ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq. Pick again pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P U such that p “ p
j pϕ,ψ,ρ0q and note that, by (26),
p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρ0q “ ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qqpϕϕ
´1
˚ ,ψψ
´1
˚ ,idq
so that, since C and C 1 are U -consistent, we finally obtain
Cppq “ C
´
ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qqpϕϕ
´1
˚ ,ψψ
´1
˚ ,idq
¯
“ ψψ´1˚ Cpp
j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq
“ ψψ´1˚ C
1ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ C 1
´
ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qqpϕϕ
´1
˚ ,ψψ
´1
˚ ,idq
¯
“ C 1ppq.
C.4 Proof of piiiq ñ piq in Theorem 7
piiiq ñ piq By Theorem 28, in order to prove that that F˚UC ‰ ∅, it is sufficient to show that, for
every p P P , Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅. By Lemma 26 piq, since U is regular, for every p P P , we have
Sppq ‰ ∅. Now, for every p P P such that StabU ppq ď Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu, we have Sppq “ LpNq
so that trivially Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅. Thus, we are left with proving that, for every p P P such that
StabU ppq ­ď Sh ˆ tidu ˆ tidu, we have Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅.
From now till the end of the section, let us fix p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρ0q P StabU ppq. Recall that U is
regular; ψ is a conjugate of ρ0; Rppq is irreflexive, acyclic such that tq P LpNq : Rppq Ď qu Ď Cppq
and condition paq is satisfied. We have to prove that Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅.
We are going to exhibit an element of the set Sppq XCppq, namely the linear order q defined in
(41). The construction of q is quite tricky and relies on some preliminary lemmas concerning the
properties of the relation Rppq and of its transitive extension R˚ppq defined in (38). Thus, the first
part of the proof is devoted to the study of such relations.
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Since ψ is a conjugate of ρ0, we have that ψ has the same type of ρ0 and, in particular, |ψ| “ 2.
Let pxˆjq
r
j“1 P N
r be a system of representatives of the ψ-orbits. Thus r is the number of ψ-orbits
and we have
Opψq “ ttxˆj , ψpxˆjqu : j P vrwu .
Note that if n is even, then r “ n
2
; ψ has no fixed point; |txˆj , ψpxˆjqu| “ 2 for all j P vrw. If instead
n is odd, then r “ n`1
2
; ψ has a unique fixed point, say xˆr; |txˆj , ψpxˆjqu| “ 2 for all j P vr ´ 1w.
Rppq acyclic implies Rppq asymmetric. Thus, x ľRppq y is equivalent to x ąRppq y and implies
x ‰ y. We will write, for compactness, x ą y instead of x ąRppq y. Then, for every x, y P N , we
translate condition paq into
x ą y ô ψpyq ą ψpxq. (37)
Given x, y P N with x ‰ y, a chain γ for Rppq (or a Rppq-chain) from x to y is an ordered sequence
x1, . . . , xl, with l ě 2, of distinct elements of N such that x1 “ x, xl “ y, and, for every j P vl´ 1w,
pxj , xj`1q P Rppq. The number l´ 1 is called the length of the chain, x its starting point and y its
end point.
Consider now the following relation on N ,
R˚ppq “ tpx, yq P N2 : there exists a Rppq-chain from x to yu, (38)
and note that R˚ppq Ě Rppq.
Lemma 37. R˚ppq is asymmetric and transitive. Moreover, for every x, y P N , px, yq P R˚ppq if
and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P R˚ppq.
Proof. Let us prove first that R˚ppq is asymmetric. Let px, yq P R˚ppq. Then, there exists a Rppq-
chain from x to y, that is, there exist l ě 2 distinct x1, . . . , xl P N such that x “ x1, y “ xl and,
for every j P vl ´ 1w, xj ą xj`1. Assume, by contradiction, that py, xq P R
˚ppq. Then there exist
m ě 2 distinct y1, . . . , ym P N such that y “ y1, x “ ym and, for every j P vm ´ 1w, yj ą yj`1.
Consider now the set A “ tj P t2, . . . ,mu : yj P tx1, . . . , xl´1uu. Clearly, because ym “ x1, we have
m P A ‰ ∅. Let us define then m˚ “ minA, so that there exists l˚ P vl ´ 1w such that ym˚ “ xl˚ .
Then it is easy to check that xl˚ , xl˚`1, . . . , xl, y2, . . . , ym˚ is a sequence of at least three elements
in N , with no repetition up to the xl˚ “ ym˚ , which is a cycle in Rppq and the contradiction is
found.
Let us prove now that R˚ppq is transitive. Let px, yq, py, zq P R˚ppq. Then, by the definition of
R˚ppq, there exist l ě 2 distinct x1, . . . , xl P N such that x “ x1, y “ xl and, for every j P vl ´ 1w,
xj ą xj`1; moreover, there are m ě 2 distinct y1, . . . , ym P N such that y “ y1, z “ ym and, for
every j P vm ´ 1w, yj ą yj`1. Consider then the sequence γ of alternatives x1, . . . , xl, y2, . . . , ym.
We show that those alternatives are all distinct. Assume that there exist i P vlw and j P vmw with
xi “ yj . Then we have a Rppq-chain with starting point xi and end point y as well as a Rppq-chain
with starting point y and end point yj “ xi, that is, pxi, yq P R
˚ppq and py, xiq P R
˚ppq, against the
asymmetry. It follows that γ is a chain from x to z, so that px, zq P R˚ppq.
We are left with proving that px, yq P R˚ppq if and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P R˚ppq. Let px, yq P
R˚ppq and consider l ě 2 distinct x1, . . . , xl P N such that x “ x1, y “ xl and, for every j P vl´ 1w,
xj ą xj`1. Defining, for every j P vlw, yj “ ψpxl´j`1q and using (37), it is immediately checked
that ψpyq “ y1, ψpxq “ yl and that, for every j P vl ´ 1w, yj ą yj`1. In other words, we have a
R˚ppq-chain from ψpyq to ψpxq, that is, pψpyq, ψpxqq P R˚ppq. The other implication is now a trivial
consequence of |ψ| “ 2.
In what follows, we write x ãÑ y instead of px, yq P R˚ppq and x ­ãÑ y instead of px, yq R R˚ppq.
As consequence of Lemma 37, for every x, y, z P N , the following relations hold true: x ­ãÑ x; x ãÑ y
implies y ­ãÑ x; x ãÑ y and y ãÑ z imply x ãÑ z; x ãÑ y is equivalent to ψpyq ãÑ ψpxq.
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Define now, for every z P N , the subset of N
Γpzq “ tx P N : x ãÑ zu.
Note that z R Γpzq and that it may happen that Γpzq “ ∅. This is the case exactly when, for every
x P N , the relation x ą z does not hold. Define now the subset of N
Γ “
Ť
zPN rΓpzq X Γpψpzqqs.
Lemma 38. Let x, y P N. If y P Γ and x ãÑ y, then x P Γ.
Proof. Let x, y P N and x ãÑ y with y P Γ. Thus, there exists z P N such that y ãÑ z and y ãÑ ψpzq.
By transitivity we conclude that also x ãÑ z and x ãÑ ψpzq, that is, x P Γ.
Lemma 39. The following facts hold true:
piq Γ X ψpΓq “ ∅;
piiq if n is odd, then xˆr R Γ Y ψpΓq. Moreover, if x P Γ, then xˆr ­ãÑ x;
piiiq for every x P N , |tx, ψpxqu X Γ| ď 1.
Proof. piq Assume that there exists x P N with x P Γ and x P ψpΓq. Since |ψ| “ 2, this gives
ψpxq P Γ, so that there exist z, y P N with
x ãÑ z, x ãÑ ψpzq, ψpxq ãÑ y, ψpxq ãÑ ψpyq. (39)
By Lemma 37 applied to the second and fourth relation in (39), we also get
z ãÑ ψpxq, y ãÑ x. (40)
From (39) and (40) and by transitivity of ãÑ, we deduce that ψpxq ãÑ x and x ãÑ ψpxq, against the
asymmetry of R˚ppq established in Lemma 37.
piiq Assume that xˆr P Γ Y ψpΓq. Then, by (i), we have xˆr “ ψpxˆrq P Γ X ψpΓq “ ∅, a
contradiction. Next let x P Γ and xˆr ãÑ x. Then, by Lemma 38, we also have xˆr P Γ, a contradiction.
piiiq Assume there is x P N such that both x and ψpxq belong to Γ. Then x P ψpΓq and so
x P Γ X ψpΓq “ ∅, against piq.
Lemma 40. Let n be odd and x P N . Then:
piq x ãÑ xˆr implies tx, ψpxqu X Γ “ txu;
piiq xˆr ãÑ x implies tx, ψpxqu X Γ “ tψpxqu.
Proof. piq From x ãÑ xˆr, we get x P Γpxˆrq Ď Γ and thus Lemma 39(i) gives ψpxq R Γ. It follows
that tx, ψpxqu X Γ “ txu.
piiq From xˆr ãÑ x, using Lemma 37, we obtain ψpxq ãÑ xˆr and (i) applies to ψpxq, giving
tx, ψpxqu X Γ “ tψpxqu.
Given X Ď N , define
Θpp,Xq “
 
l P LpXq : Rppq XX2 Ď l
(
.
Since R is acyclic, then RppqXX2 is an acyclic relation on X and thus it admits a linear extension,
so that Θpp,Xq ‰ ∅. Note that if Y Ď X Ď N and l P Θpp,Xq, then the restriction of l to Y
belongs to Θpp, Y q. Moreover, since CR refines C, we have Θpp,Nq Ď Cppq.
For every j P vrw, consider txˆj , ψpxˆjqu X Γ. By Lemma 39 piiiq the order of this set cannot
exceed 1. Define then the sets
J “ tj P vrw : |txˆj , ψpxˆjqu X Γ| “ 1u, J
˚ “ tj P vrwzJ : |txˆj , ψpxˆjqu| “ 2u.
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Of course, for every j P vrwzJ , we have txˆj , ψpxˆjqu X Γ “ ∅. Note also that, when n is even, we
have J Y J˚ “ vrw; if n is odd, by Lemma 39 piiq, we have J Y J˚ “ vr´ 1w. For every j P J , let us
call yj the unique element in the set txˆj , ψpxˆjqu X Γ so that Γ “ tyj : j P Ju.
Consider now the subset of N defined by
T “ tyj : j P Ju Y
Ť
jPJ˚txˆj , ψpxˆjqu
and note that T Ě Γ. Let l P Θpp, T q and for j P J˚, let yj be the maximum of txˆj , ψpxˆjqu with
respect to l, so that yj ąl ψpyjq. Define
M “ tyj : j P J Y J
˚u.
Observe that if n is even, then M Y ψpMq “ N ; if n is odd, then M Y ψpMq “ Nztxˆru. Moreover,
we have |M | “ tn
2
u, M XψpMq “ ∅ and Γ ĎM Ď T . The restriction of l P Θpp, T q to M is a linear
order g P Θpp,Mq. We can assume that
a1 ąg . . . ąg atn
2
u
where M “ ta1, . . . , atn
2
uu. Finally, consider the linear order q on N such that
a1 ąq . . . ąq atn
2
u ąq ψ
`
atn
2
u
˘
ąq . . . ąq ψpa1q if n is even
a1 ąq . . . ąq atn
2
u ąq xˆr ąq ψ
`
atn
2
u
˘
ąq . . . ąq ψpa1q if n is odd,
(41)
and prove that q P Sppq X Cppq. Note that in the upper part of q there are the alternatives in M
and in the lower one those in ψpMq; in the odd case, the fixed point xˆr of ψ is ranked in the middle,
at the position r “ n`1
2
.
By construction, we have that ψqρ0 “ q, which implies, due to the regularity of U , that q P Sppq.
As a consequence, we have that, for every x, y P N ,
y ąq x if and only if ψpxq ąq ψpyq, (42)
because, since ψ2 “ id,
y ąq x ô y ąψqρ0 x ô ψ
2pxq ąψq ψ
2pyq ô ψpxq ąq ψpyq.
In order to complete the proof we need to show that q P Cppq. Since we know that Θpp,Nq Ď
Cppq, we proceed showing that q P Θpp,Nq. We need to prove that Rppq Ď q, that is, that for every
x, y P N , x ą y implies x ąq y. Since when n is even we have N “ M Y ψpMq and when n is odd
we have N “M Y ψpMq Y txˆru, we reduce to prove that, for every x, y PM :
paq x ą y implies x ąq y;
pbq x ą ψpyq implies x ąq ψpyq;
pcq ψpxq ą ψpyq implies ψpxq ąq ψpyq;
pdq ψpxq ą y implies ψpxq ąq y,
and, in the odd case, showing further that, for every x PM :
peq x ą xˆr implies x ąq xˆr;
pfq xˆr ą x implies xˆr ąq x;
pgq ψpxq ą xˆr implies ψpxq ąq xˆr;
phq xˆr ą ψpxq implies xˆr ąq ψpxq.
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Fix then x, y P M and prove first paq, pbq, pcq and pdq. Note that x ‰ ψpxq and y ‰ ψpyq, because
we have observed that if ψ admits the fixed point xˆr, then xˆr RM.
paq Let x ą y. Since g P Θpp,Mq, we have x ąg y and then also x ąq y.
pbq By the construction of q, for every x, y PM, we have x ąq ψpyq.
pcq Let ψpxq ą ψpyq. Then, by (37), we also have y ą x and by paq we get y ąq x, which by (42)
implies ψpxq ąq ψpyq.
pdq Let us prove that the condition ψpxq ą y never realizes. Indeed, assume by contradiction
ψpxq ą y. Then, by (37), we also have ψpyq ą x. If y P Γ, then, by (37), we have ψpxq P Γ ĎM
and thus x P M X ψpMq “ ∅, a contradiction. Thus, we reduce to the case y R Γ. If x P Γ,
then, again by Lemma 38, ψpyq P Γ Ď M and we get the contradiction y P M X ψpMq “ ∅.
If instead x R Γ, then x, ψpxq, y, ψpyq P T . As a consequence, ψpxq ą y implies ψpxq ąl y and
ψpyq ą x implies ψpyq ąl x. Moreover, as y is the maximum of ty, ψpyqu with respect to l,
we also have y ąl ψpyq. By transitivity of f , we then get ψpxq ąl x, which is a contradiction
because x is the maximum of tx, ψpxqu with respect to l.
Assume now that n is odd. Then fix x PM and prove peq, pfq, pgq and phq.
peq This case is trivial, because, by the construction of q, for every x PM , we have x ąq xˆr.
pfq Let us prove that it cannot be xˆr ą x. Assume, by contradiction, xˆr ą x. Then, by Lemma
40(ii) we get ψpxq P Γ ĎM, against M X ψpMq “ ∅.
pgq Let us prove that it cannot be ψpxq ą xˆr . Assume, by contradiction, ψpxq ą xˆr. Then, by
Lemma 40(i), we get ψpxq P Γ ĎM against M X ψpMq “ ∅.
phq This case is trivial because, by the construction of q, we have xˆr ąq ψpxq for all x PM.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 27
Given p P P , there exist a unique j P PU such that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρq for some pϕ, ψ, ρq P U . We
claim that, if for some j P PU there exist pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q, pϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q P U such that p
j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q “
pj pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2q, then ψ1qjρ1 “ ψ2qjρ2. Indeed, by (26), we have that p
j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q “ pj pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2q
implies pϕ´1
2
ϕ1, ψ
´1
2
ψ1, ρ
´1
2
ρ1q P StabU pp
jq. Since qj P Spp
jq and Ω is abelian, we have that
qj “ ψ
´1
2
ψ1qjρ
´1
2
ρ1 “ ψ
´1
2
ψ1qjρ1ρ
´1
2
, and thus ψ1qjρ1 “ ψ2qjρ2.
As a consequence, the resolute spc f defined, for every p P P , by fppq “ ψqjρ, where j P P
U
and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U are such that p “ pj pϕ,ψ,ρq, is consistent. Moreover, for every j P PU , fppjq “ qj .
Let us prove that f P P˚U . Consider p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U . Let p “ pj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q, for some j P PU
and pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q P U . By the definition of f and by (26) and using again the fact that Ω is abelian,
we have
fpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ f
ˆ´
pj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q
¯pϕ,ψ,ρq˙
“ fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρρ1qq “ pψψ1qqjpρρ1q
“ pψψ1qqjpρ1ρq “ ψpψ1qjρ1qρ “ ψfpp
j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1qqρ “ ψfppqρ.
In order to prove the uniqueness of f , it suffices to note that if f 1 P F˚U is such that, for every
j P PU , f 1ppjq “ qj , then we have f “ f
1 by Proposition 23.
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 30
Let C P PU . Consider f P F defined as follows. Given p P P , consider the unique j P PU such that
p P j and the nonempty set Up “ tpϕ, ψ, idq P U : p “ p
j pϕ,ψ,idqu. Pick pϕ, ψ, idq P Up and let fppq “
ψxj . We need to prove that the value of fppq does not depend on the particular element chosen in
Up. Indeed, let pϕ1, ψ1, idq, pϕ2, ψ2, idq P Up and note that pϕ
´1
2
ϕ1, ψ
´1
2
ψ1, idq P StabU pp
jq. Since
U is regular, that gives ψ1 “ ψ2 and then ψ1xj “ ψ2xj .
We show that f satisfies all the desired properties. Since U ď G, we have pid, id, idq P U and
thus the definition of f immediately implies fppjq “ xj . Let us prove that f P F
U . Consider p P P
and pϕ, ψ, idq P U and show that fpppϕ,ψ,idqq “ ψfppq. Let p “ pj pϕ1,ψ1,idq for suitable j P PU and
pϕ1, ψ1, idq P U . Thus, fppq “ ψ1xj and, by (26), fpp
pϕ,ψ,idqq “ fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,idqq “ ψψ1xj “ ψfppq.
Let us next prove that f P FC . Consider then p P P and show that fppq P Cppq. Let p “
pj pϕ1,ψ1,idq for suitable j P PU and pϕ1, ψ1, idq P U . Thus, fppq “ ψ1xj and, since C is U -
consistent, ψ1xj P ψ1Cpp
jq “ Cppj pϕ1,ψ1,idqq “ Cppq. Finally, in order to prove uniqueness, let
f 1 P FUC such that f
1ppjq “ xj for all j P P
U . Then f 1 and f coincides on ppjqjPPU P SpUq and
Proposition 24 applies giving f 1 “ f.
Let now C P CUk . The proposition can be proved using the same argument.
C.7 Proof of Theorem 31
Let C P PU . Consider f P FUC and note that, for every j P P
U , fppjq P Cppjq and Φ
`
pfppjqqjPPU
˘
“
f . Thus Φ is bijective and we have |FUC | “
ˇˇ
ˆjPPUCpp
jq
ˇˇ
“
ś
jPPU
ˇˇ
Cppjq
ˇˇ
. Finally note that if C
is decisive, then, for every j P PU , Cppjq ‰ ∅ so that FUC ‰ ∅.
Let now C P CUk . The theorem can be proved using the same argument.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 32
Let C P PU . Given j P PU
2
, consider the set KU ppjq “
 
σ P Sn : ψj “ σρ0σ
´1
(
, where ψj is defined
in (30). Since U is regular, KU ppjq is nonempty so that we can choose an element σj in K
U ppjq.
Note that, for every j P PU
2
and pϕ, ψ, ρq P StabU pp
jq, we have ψ “ σjρσ
´1
j .
Let us consider then f P F defined, for every p P P , as follows. Given p P P , consider the
unique j P PU such that p P j and the nonempty set Up “ tpϕ, ψ, ρq P U : p “ p
j pϕ,ψ,ρqu. Pick
pϕ, ψ, ρq P Up and let
fppq “
$’’&
’’%
ψyj if j P P
U
1
and ρ “ id
ψψ´1˚ zj if j P P
U
1 and ρ “ ρ0
ψσjρσ
´1
j xj if j P P
U
2
We need to prove that the value of fppq does not depend on the particular element chosen in Up.
Indeed, let pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q, pϕ2, ψ2, ρ2q P Up and recall that pϕ
´1
2
ϕ1, ψ
´1
2
ψ1, ρ
´1
2
ρ1q P StabU pp
jq.
- If j P PU
1
, then pϕ´1
2
ϕ1, ψ
´1
2
ψ1, ρ
´1
2
ρ1q P StabU pp
jq implies ρ2 “ ρ1 and ψ1 “ ψ2. As a
consequence, if ρ1 “ ρ2 “ id, then ψ1yj “ ψ2yj , while if ρ1 “ ρ2 “ ρ0, then pψ1ψ
´1
˚ qzj “
pψ2ψ
´1
˚ qzj .
- If j P PU
2
, then pϕ´1
2
ϕ1, ψ
´1
2
ψ1, ρ
´1
2
ρ1q P StabU pp
jq implies ψ´1
2
ψ1 “ σjρ
´1
2
ρ1σ
´1
j , that is,
ψ1σjρ1σ
´1
j “ ψ2σjρ2σ
´1
j , as ρ “ ρ
´1 for all ρ P Ω. Then we get ψ1σjρ1σ
´1
j xj “ ψ2σjρ2σ
´1
j xj .
We show that f satisfies all the desired properties. Since U ď G, we have pid, id, idq P U and
thus the definition of f immediately implies fppjq “ yj and fpp
j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ zj for all j P P
U
1 ,
and fppjq “ xj for all j P P
U
2
. We prove that f P FU . Consider p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U and show
that if ρ “ id, then fpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψfppq; if ρ “ ρ0, then fpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq ‰ ψfppq. Let p “ pj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q
for suitable j P PU and pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q P U .
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- If j P PU1 and ρ1 “ id, then fppq “ ψ1yj . By (26), if ρ “ id, then fpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,idqq “
ψψ1yj “ ψfppq, while if ρ “ ρ0, then fpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρ0qq “ ψψ1ψ
´1
˚ zj ‰ ψψ1yj “
ψfppq, since zj ‰ ψ˚yj because pyj , zjq P A
1
Cpp
jq.
- If j P PU
1
and ρ1 “ ρ0, then fppq “ ψ1ψ
´1
˚ zj . By (26), if ρ “ id, then fpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “
fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρ0qq “ ψψ1ψ
´1
˚ zj “ ψfppq, while if ρ “ ρ0, then fpp
pϕ,ψ,ρqq “ fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,idqq “
ψψ1yj ‰ ψψ1ψ
´1
˚ zj “ ψfppq, since zj ‰ ψ˚yj because pyj , zjq P A
1
Cpp
jq.
- If j P PU
2
, then fppq “ ψ1σjρ1σ
´1
j xj and, by (26),
fpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ fppj pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρρ1qq “ ψψ1σjρρ1σ
´1
j xj .
As a consequence, if ρ “ id, we get fpppϕ,ψ,ρqq “ ψfppq. If instead ρ “ ρ0, we have
that fpppϕ,ψ,ρqq ‰ ψfppq if and only if ψψ1σjρ0ρ1σ
´1
j xj ‰ ψψ1σjρ1σ
´1
j xj if and only if
σjρ0σ
´1
j xj ‰ xj . However, the last relation holds true since σjρ0σ
´1
j “ ψj and ψjxj ‰ xj
because xj P A
2
Cpp
jq.
Let us next prove that f P FC . Consider p P P and show that fppq P Cppq. Let p “ p
j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q
for suitable j P PU and pϕ1, ψ1, ρ1q P U .
- If j P PU
1
and ρ1 “ id, then fppq “ ψ1yj and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ1yj P ψ1Cpp
jq “
Cppj pϕ1,ψ1,idqq “ Cppq.
- If j P PU
1
and ρ1 “ ρ0, then fppq “ ψ1ψ
´1
˚ zj and, by (26) and the U -consistency of C,
ψ1ψ
´1
˚ zj P ψ1ψ
´1
˚ Cpp
j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “
C
´
ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qqpϕ1ϕ
´1
˚ ,ψ1ψ
´1
˚ ,idq
¯
“ Cppj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0qq “ Cppq.
- If j P PU
2
and ρ1 “ id, then fppq “ ψ1xj and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ1xj P ψ1Cpp
jq “
Cppj pϕ1,ψ1,idqq “ Cppq.
- If j P PU2 and ρ1 “ ρ0, then let pϕ2, ψ2, ρ0q P U be such that p
j pϕ2,ψ2,ρ0q “ pj . By (26), we
have
p “ pj pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0q “ ppj pϕ2,ψ2,ρ0qqpϕ1ϕ
´1
2
,ψ1ψ
´1
2
,idq “ pj pϕ1ϕ
´1
2
,ψ1ψ
´1
2
,idq.
Thus, fppq “ ψ1ψ
´1
2
xj and, by the U -consistency of C,
ψ1ψ
´1
2
xj P ψ1ψ
´1
2
Cppjq “ Cppj pϕ1ϕ
´1
2
,ψ1ψ
´1
2
,idqq “ Cppq.
Finally, in order to prove uniqueness, let f 1 P FUC such that f
1ppjq “ yj and f
1ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ zj
for all j P PU1 , and f
1ppjq “ xj for all j P P
U
2 . Then f, f
1 P PU realize fppjq “ f 1ppjq for all j P PU
and fppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq “ f 1ppj pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0qq for all j P PU
1
. Hence, the thesis follows from Proposition
24.
Let now C P CUk . The proposition can be proved using the same argument.
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